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PRAGMATISM RULES
Elizabeth G. Porter†
The Roberts Court’s decisions interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are reshaping the litigation landscape. Yet neither scholars, nor the Court itself, have articulated a coherent theory of interpretation for the Rules. This
Article constructs a theory of Rules interpretation by discerning and critically examining the two starkly different methodologies the Roberts Court applies in its Rules cases. It traces
the roots of both methodologies, explaining how they arise
from—and reinforce—structural, linguistic, and epistemological tensions inherent in the Rules and the rulemaking process.
Then, drawing from administrative law, it suggests a theoretical framework that accommodates both. This theory simultaneously advances our understanding of the Rules and
challenges the hegemony of statutes, which currently provide
the dominant—if not sole—blueprint for theories of
interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
Now well into its “civil procedure revival,”1 the Roberts
Court has decided more cases involving the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in ten years than the Rehnquist Court did in
twice that time.2 Many of these decisions are big news. Iqbal
and Twombly alone have been cited almost 430,000 times—
more than Miranda, Chevron, and Brown v. Board of Education
put together.3 Scholars have hotly criticized the tenor, the reasoning, and the outcome of these cases.4 Despite this voluminous criticism, there has been no sustained focus on the
interpretive methodologies the Roberts Court uses in reaching
its Rules decisions.5 The study of interpretation is preoccupied
entirely with statutes. In comparison, the Rules are the girlnext-door of legal texts—overlooked in a comfortable, seductively familiar way.
1
Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival,
31 REV. LITIG. 313, 316 (2012).
2
See cases cited infra note 32 for a complete list.
3
According to Westlaw, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
has been cited over 250,000 times, while Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
has been cited over 180,000 times. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(108,000); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (70,000); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (21,000).
4
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 826 (2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal changed
everything.”); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 286, 304 (2013) (lamenting that the Court has “placed a thumb on the
justice scale favoring corporate and government defendants”); Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence
of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1737 (2014) (criticizing “dubious” interpretations of Rules 8, 23, and 56); Stephen N. Subrin &
Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1839, 1841 (2014) (“[T]he core values of [the civil] rules have been eviscerated by
judicial decisions.”).
5
Only a handful of scholars have addressed Rules interpretation over the
past three decades, and none have sought to identify or analyze the Roberts
Court’s methodologies. See Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavione: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 720, 723 (1988) (criticizing the Court’s
cramped, “inflexible” interpretation of the Rules); David Marcus, Institutions and
an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 927, 930 (2011) (noting “the dearth of interpretive theory for the Federal
Rules”); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1039–40 (1993) (questioning the
Court’s trend toward a “plain meaning” interpretative approach and advocating
instead for the Court to take a more “activist role”); Catherine T. Struve, The
Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1099, 1100–01 (2002) (stating “few scholars have addressed the interpretation of other sets of rules, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
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This Article remedies that methodological neglect. It builds
a Rules interpretive theory by discerning and critically examining the two starkly different methodologies the Roberts Court
applies in its Rules decisions. It traces the roots of both methodologies, explaining how they arise from—and reinforce—
structural, linguistic, and epistemological tensions inherent in
the Rules and the rulemaking process. Then, drawing from
administrative law, it suggests a theoretical framework that
accommodates both. In setting forth a coherent theory of Rules
interpretation, this Article simultaneously advances the understanding of the Rules and challenges the hegemony of statutes,
which currently provide the dominant—if not sole—blueprint
for theories of interpretation.6
To begin, this Article identifies and critiques the Roberts
Court’s methodology of Rules interpretation. Or, more accurately, its methodologies—because the Roberts Court has two.
These dueling interpretive paradigms emanate from different
sources of power and send different messages about the
Court’s view of its authority to establish litigation norms. Yet
because we take the Rules for granted—because they are part
of the judicial furniture—we have thus far failed to recognize,
much less regulate, these contradictory methodologies. The
result is a Rules jurisprudence that is sprawling yet elusive;
familiar yet foreign.
On one side of the duel between paradigms is the Court’s
“statutory” mode of Rules interpretations. This mode’s weapons are the familiar tools of statutory interpretation. Justice
Scalia once described the Rules as “binding as any statute.”7
As his use of simile suggests, the Rules are not in fact statutes.8 But—because our understanding of interpretation is
dominated by a single-minded focus on statutes—the Court’s
decisions in this mode treat Rules and statutes as functionally
6
As others have noted, scholars’ and courts’ single-minded focus on federal
statutory interpretation has displaced needed attention from other important areas of textual interpretation. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of
Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) (arguing that scholars have wrongly ignored
state courts’ theories of statutory interpretation); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting
Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 357–58 (2012) (criticizing neglect of study of
the interpretation of agency regulations).
7
See Bank of N. S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (describing a
Rule as “binding as any statute”).
8
Congress delegated to the Court the power “to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure” for cases in federal district courts and courts of appeals,
subject to congressional acquiescence. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). Thus, the
Rules are more akin to agency regulations. See infra Part I for a description of the
rulemaking process.
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interchangeable. Whether interpreting gatekeeper Rules such
as Rule 8 and 23, or other less controversial provisions, the
Court’s statutory Rules cases are straightforward and clear, if
perhaps a touch dull. In its statutory mode, the Court disclaims its power to influence the Rules. It frequently admonishes litigants and lower courts that changes to the Rules must
come through the rulemaking process and not through judicial
adjudication.9 The implication is that even if the Court might
prefer a different result, its hands are tied.10
Until, of course, they are not tied. On the other side in this
duel—and steadily gaining ground—is a starkly different, almost antistatutory methodology: one oriented toward pragmatism and power. When it operates in this second paradigm,
which this Article denotes its “managerial” mode, the Roberts
Court ignores the analogy between the Rules and statutes. Instead, the Court treats the Rules as an organic part of itself—
an extension or component of its common-law judicial power.
Accordingly, it eschews the tools of statutory interpretation in
favor of the hallmark rhetorical techniques of common-law decision-making: analysis of precedent, a deep focus on the facts
of the particular case before it, and implicit or overt reliance on
public policy,11 with an occasional dash of textualism thrown
in for decorative purposes.12 Modern legal scholarship has
documented the evolution of trial court judges from neutral
“umpires” to hands-on litigation “managers.”13 Managerial
judges are less neutral, less restrained—more hands-on—than
their more neutral predecessors.14 As the Roberts Court’s second interpretive paradigm proves, this managerial mindset has
9
See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007) (“We once again reiterate, however—as we did unanimously in Leatherman, Swierkiewicz, and Hill—
that adopting different and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular
categories of cases should be done through established rulemaking procedures,
and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts.”).
10
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997) (“Federal
courts, in any case, lack authority to substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria
a standard never adopted.”)
11
See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 13–14 (1921) (observing
the “extreme individualism” of the common law, which “tries questions of the
highest social import as mere private controversies”).
12
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (half-heartedly feigning to attribute heightened pleading requirements to the word “show” in Rule 8).
13
See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77
(1982) (“Many federal judges have departed from their earlier attitudes [of disengagement and dispassion]; they have dropped the relatively disinterested pose to
adopt a more active, ‘managerial’ stance.”).
14
Id. at 378; Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive
Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013) (describing a managerial judge as
“involved in case management from the outset of the litigation and attentive
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trickled up into the Supreme Court’s Rules decisions. Although the Roberts Court did not invent managerial Rules interpretation, it has taken it to a new prominence. In this Court,
pragmatism rules.15
The Court’s watershed decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes16 offers a side-by-side demonstration of the Court’s dueling interpretive paradigms. Wal-Mart involves two questions
about Rule 23, and the Court unmistakably shifts interpretive
modes as it moves between the two questions. The first question—the scope of Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement17—
was decided by a divided Court, firmly in managerial mode.
The much-criticized majority opinion ignores the standard of
review and barely glances at the text of (a)(2);18 nor does it
attempt to divine the intent of the Rule 23 drafters by any of the
traditional approaches of statutory interpretation. In fact, although purportedly the “crux” of the case,19 (a)(2) plays an
oddly secondary role in the Court’s analysis: the Court treats it
almost as a vehicle through which to address substantive questions about Title VII.20 This part of Wal-Mart radiates a sense of
the Court’s inherent power to set litigation norms through common-law rulings—a sense of managerial control.21
In answering the second question in Wal-Mart, however,
which concerned the availability of Rule 23(b)(2) certification to
classes seeking back pay, the Court—now unanimous—shifts
abruptly into its statutory paradigm. This part of the opinion
relies on such traditional interpretive factors as the provision’s
throughout the proceedings to the impact of her decisions on settlement
dynamics”).
15
For an example of a managerial approach in the Rehnquist Court, see Rufo
v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (creating the more flexible
“significant change in circumstances” standard for modifying certain consent
decrees under Rule 60(b)(5), rather than extending application of its “grievous
wrong” standard); see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497 (2001) (federal common law, not Rule 41, governs the claim preclusive effect
of a dismissal upon the merits).
16
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
17
In order to obtain class certification, Rule 23 requires plaintiffs to show
“commonality,” i.e., that ‘‘there are questions of law or fact common to the class.’’
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
18
See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court,
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29 (2011) (agreeing with “the intuition that the majority
might be performing some kind of alchemy on the 23(a)(2) commonality
requirement”).
19
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550.
20
See Wolff, supra note 14, at 1034 (observing that “[t]he handful of statements on Rule 23 and commonality play only an equivocal role in the analysis”).
21
See id. at 1044 (describing Wal-Mart as an example of “robust interstitial
federal common law”).
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text, its historical purpose, and the structure of Rule 23 as a
whole.22 Whereas 23(a)(2) was almost an afterthought in the
first part of the opinion, the Court’s Rule 23(b)(2) analysis is
straightforward, Rule centered, and deferential to the intent of
the rulemakers.23 The (b)(2) section of the opinion might almost have been written by a different justice; certainly it emanates from a different locus of judicial power.
The Roberts Court’s dueling Rules methodologies use different techniques and manifest different attitudes toward the
rulemaking process; they don’t talk the same talk. It might
thus be tempting to argue that only one of these paradigms—
the restrained, if staid, statutory paradigm—is valid, and that
the Court’s managerial Rules decisions are an abuse of
power.24 But this Article explains why the opposite is true:
both paradigms are potentially problematic, yet both have
value. Moreover, both are here to stay. The uneasy coexistence
of these contradictory paradigms is the natural and predictable
result of tensions that are fundamental to—indeed, baked
into—the Rules and the rulemaking process.
The first such tension is structural: The Court sets policy
through promulgating the Rules and through interpreting
them in adjudication.25 The Court’s role as a rulemaker supports the more constrained, statutory reading of the Rules, but
its adjudicative powers point in the opposite direction. The
second tension is internal to the Rules themselves. Starting
with Rule 1, the Rules deliberately use abstract, discretion22
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (“Permitting the combination of individualized
and classwide relief in a (b)(2) class is also inconsistent with the structure of Rule
23(b).”).
23
Id. (citing Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966), summarizing cases interpreting (b)(2)).
24
See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 PA. L.
REV. 1731, 1738 (2014) (describing key decisions interpreting Rule 8, 23, and 56
as “[a]ll promis[ing] to discourage suits, burden plaintiffs, and defeat large numbers of claims”); see also Brooke Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV.
307, 310–11 (2014) (arguing that in procedural cases, the Justices’ views of the
litigation system are better predictions of their position than their alleged commitments to federalism); see generally Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The
Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012) (arguing that the Court should refer to the rulemaking process all Rules-based questions that it cannot resolve through statutory
interpretation); Purcell, Jr., supra, at 1760 (stating that the “conservative Justices
adapted their judicial methodologies to serve their ideological purposes”).
25
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1190 (“[T]he Court’s role in
civil procedure is to set policy . . . through case-by-case adjudication . . . or by
promulgating generally applicable rules through a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure.”).
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ary—almost poetic—language in order to allow district courts
to achieve the flexible goal of procedural due process.26 But
the same malleable language that gives trial courts breathing
space also confers interpretive latitude on the Supreme Court.
The Rules have play in the joints, and that limberness creates
interpretive instability. Finally, the Court’s conflicting methodologies for interpreting the Rules arise from unresolvable epistemological tensions between procedure and substance, and
between the Rules’ trans-substantive ideal and their casebound, fact-specific reality.27 The Court’s statutory mode for
interpreting the Rules rests on a firm, if slightly artificial, distinction between procedure and substance.28 Its managerial
interpretations undermine that distinction at every turn.
These interpretive fault lines, which are as certain as
death—or at least taxes—defeat any attempt to conflate the
Rules with statutes. They also offer theoretical support for
both of the Roberts Court’s Rules methodologies. Any framework for Rules interpretation must therefore consider and accommodate both paradigms rather than simply wishing one
away. At the same time, both approaches should be regulated.
Brittle textualism in the statutory mode could undermine the
Rules’ vision of an accessible, merits-focused civil justice system. On the other end of the spectrum, the Roberts Court’s
managerial interpretations have frequently intruded too far
into the realm of the true managerial courts—the lower courts.
From Wal-Mart to Twombly, it is the fact-intensive, merits-determining tendency of the Roberts Court that defines the worst
elements of its Rules decisions.29
Drawing on administrative law, this Article proposes a
Chevron-inspired deference regime that would preserve the
Court’s flexibility while simultaneously reining in its interpretive excesses. The selection of administrative law is purposeful: The Rules are not statutes, and it is therefore
important not to construe them by reflexively applying a statutory lens. In their promulgation and implementation, the Rules
26
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (the Rules “should be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding”).
27
See infra Part II.C; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)
(noting that the Rules “regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either”).
28
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (“The line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’
shifts as the legal context changes.”).
29
See infra Part I.B.
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much more closely resemble agency regulations. Indeed, recently other scholars have also analogized the Court to an
agency, in order to demonstrate that the Court is insufficiently
deferential to the rulemaking process.30 But this proposed
Chevron-style regime is different: It is aimed at protecting deference to the lower courts, not to rulemakers.31 Because the
Rules are more akin to administrative regulations than to statutes, the traditional standards of review that the Court applies
to its review of statutes are not perfectly apt. And as the Roberts Court’s cases show, they are also not being respected.
The suggested deference framework would support the
Court’s use of traditional tools of statutory construction in
Rules cases presenting pure questions of law. It would also
recognize as legitimate the Court’s managerial mode of interpreting the Rules, with an important caveat: in managerial
cases, which typically involve the application of the Rules to
particular facts, the Court should not impose its view of the
merits, as the Roberts Court has often done. Instead, having
announced its interpretation of a Rule, under this framework
the Court should remand to the lower courts. This dichotomy,
which finds its roots in Chevron, is familiar and workable as a
restraint on the Court’s interpretation of regulations, including
the Rules.
Part I of this Article establishes the dueling interpretive
approaches of the Roberts Court in its Rules decisions. Part II
shows how these competing approaches to Rules interpretation
are the inevitable result of unresolvable tensions that are fundamental to the Rules and the rulemaking structure. Part III
argues for a theory of Chevron-inspired deference that would
accommodate these tensions while restraining the Court’s currently unbridled interpretive power. The Article concludes by
showing how this deference structure is the foundation for a
theory of interpretation that gives the Rules the context-sensitive attention they require.

30
See, e.g., Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1192 (arguing that
administrative law principles require the Court to defer to the rulemaking process
rather than setting policy through adjudication).
31
This suggested regime parallels the so-called “weak” version of Chevron
deference championed by Justice Stevens (Chevron’s author). See GARY LAWSON,
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 541–50 (6th ed. 2013) (documenting struggle between
competing “weak” and “strong” readings of Chevron); infra Part III (noting that
although the “strong” view of Chevron has prevailed at the Supreme Court, the
“weak” version is more appropriate as a deference framework for the Rules).
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I
THE PARADIGMS OF RULES INTERPRETATION
In its first decade, the Roberts Court decided seventeen
cases interpreting the Federal Rules, ranging from watershed
decisions on Rule 23 and Rule 8 to several drier, or at least less
media-accessible, rulings on issues such as the relation back
of a new party and relief from judgment.32 One commentator
has described the Court’s methodologies for the Federal Rules
as varying “wildly and inexplicably.”33 In fact, at least for the
Roberts Court, there are methodologies to the madness. This
Part documents them.
A. Statutory Interpretation
In many of its Rules cases, the Roberts Court reflexively
interprets the Rules as if they are statutes.34 The implication
appears to be that the Rules are ultimately creatures of Congress, and therefore, for all practical (and theoretical) purposes, are just another form of statute.35 The Court’s statutory
interpretations of the Rules tend to be rational, cleanly structured, and to reach a conclusion that provides clear guidance
32
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Johnson v.
City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S.
Ct. 1166 (2013); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Amgen, Inc.
v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa,
559 U.S. 260 (2010); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
559 U.S. 393 (2010); Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009);
Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546
U.S. 394 (2006); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005).
In contrast, it took the Rehnquist court two decades to decide sixteen substantial procedural opinions. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986); Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp.,
493 U.S. 120 (1989); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Bus.
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991); Rufo
v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757
(2001); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
33
Marcus, supra note 5, at 928.
34
See Bank of N. S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (describing a
Rule as “binding as any statute”).
35
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400 (“Congress . . . has ultimate authority
over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
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for lower courts. Mirroring its approach to statutes, the Court’s
analytical departure point is the text and structure of the Rule
at issue. Several justices also rely upon the Advisory Committee Notes to ascertain the purpose and meaning of a Rule,
although currently Justice Scalia is challenging that usage on
textualist grounds.36
Statutory Rules decisions may feel familiar—even slightly
dull—but those qualities do not equate with insignificance.
The Court sometimes adopts this interpretive perspective even
in cases concerning controversial Rules, such as those governing class actions and pleading. Nor does this form of interpretation equate with unanimity. These cases yield dissents,
although typically they are respectful. The treatment of Rules
as statutes does not even guarantee that a particular justice
will be consistent in his or her approach across Rules cases.37
These decisions raise significant interpretive questions. For
example, scholars have noted and questioned an increasing
tendency toward a more rigid textualism in these types of
cases—one that might undermine the Rules’ purposive vision.38 Nevertheless, the debate in such cases draws on the
statutory part of the Court’s brain, with all of the rich experience—and theoretical baggage—that such an approach entails.
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A. epitomizes the Roberts
Court in this statutory mode. In Costa Crociere, written by
Justice Sotomayor, the Court interpreted Rule 15 to clarify the
circumstances under which an amended complaint that seeks
to add a party “relates back” to the time of the original filing in
order to satisfy the statute of limitations.39 In reaching its
conclusion, the opinion relies primarily on the plain language
of Rule 15, and it defines terms within the Rule by reference to
36
The Advisory Committee Notes are mandatory explanatory statements
promulgated by the drafters and accompanying each rule. Struve, supra note 5,
at 1113. “Notes are drafted, redrafted, voted on, and approved in much the same
manner as the text of the proposed Rules.” Id. at 1114. Although they are not
intended to be binding, they indicate the rule’s purpose, aid in interpretation, and
provide practice tips. Id. at 1112–13. To compare with Justice Scalia’s perspective on the persuasiveness of the Notes, see infra note 264 and accompanying text.
37
See Scott Dodson, Justice Souter and the Civil Rules, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
289, 291 (2010) (maintaining that Justice Souter “is not uniformly historicist,
textualist, formalist, instrumentalist, pragmaticist, or minimalist when it comes
to the civil rules”). While in Costa Crociere, 560 U.S. 538, Justice Scalia argued
for a strict textualism, he has also written or joined opinions, such as Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. 2541, that embody the values of managerial interpretation. See supra
notes 16–22 (describing interpretation of Wal-Mart).
38
See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 336 (noting phenomenon of “[s]tricter
textualism in rule interpretation”).
39
Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538.
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dictionaries.40 In addition, the Court supports its reading of
the Rule with contextual sources, including citations to the
1966 Advisory Committee Notes.41 In his lone concurrence,
Justice Scalia agrees with the Court’s reading of Rule 15 but
rejects the Court’s reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes,
contending that “the Committee’s intentions have no effect on
the Rule’s meaning.”42 As a form of statutory interpretation,
nothing about Costa Crociere is unsurprising; even Justice
Scalia’s concurrence is comforting in an old-married-couplebickering sort of way.
Other Rules decisions of the Roberts Court—including
those written by liberal as well as conservative justices—employ a similarly pedestrian range of statutory interpretation
tools. Construing Rule 50, the Court in Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Ekrich, Inc. held that the text of the Rule—as
confirmed by precedent dating as far back as the 1940s—did
not permit an appellate court to review a question of sufficiency
of the evidence unless the party seeking such review had first
filed a post-trial motion seeking such review in the district
court.43 Writing for a seven-Justice majority, Justice Thomas
relied upon the plain language of Rule 50(a) and (b), as well as
the structural purpose of the Rule—to give the trial court
judge, with her closer knowledge of the evidence, an initial
opportunity to evaluate the party’s claims.44
Notably, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Unitherm sounds in a
different key. Justice Stevens attempts to recast the question
as one of legal norms and judicial power, rather than one of
Rule interpretation—a quintessential example of the managerial interpretation discussed below.45 According to Stevens,
“[t]he spirit” of the Rules includes a “power to avoid manifestly
40

Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 541; see also id. at 551 (finding that “the Advisory Committee clearly
meant their filings to qualify as mistakes under the Rule”).
42
Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see also Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that while “the Notes are assuredly
persuasive scholarly commentaries—ordinarily the most persuasive— . . . they
bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen . . . .”).
43
546 U.S. 394, 404 (2006) (holding that “a party is not entitled to pursue a
new trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate postverdict motion in
the district court”).
44
Id. at 400, 405 (explaining why the text of Rule 50 both “confirms” and
“supports” the Court’s ruling).
45
Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This is not a case, in my view, in which
the authority of the appellate court is limited by an explicit statute or controlling
rule.”).
41
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unjust results in exceptional cases.”46 But the majority in
Unitherm privileges the text of the Rule over this abstract
“spirit,” thus remaining firmly in statutory mode. Other recent
Roberts Court decisions manifest a similarly statutory
methodology.47
It might theoretically be possible that the Court adheres to
this statutory paradigm except in the rare cases when it confronts gatekeeping provisions like Rules 8, 23, and 56 that
inevitably raise difficult policy questions. But the Roberts
Court often adopts its statutory approach even in cases addressing controversial, gate-keeper Rules. For example, in
Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, the
Court concluded that a securities class action plaintiff need not
prove the materiality of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations at the certification stage in order to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b).48 In rejecting the defendant’s
effort to ratchet up the proof requirement at the certification
stage, the Court relied upon the text of the Rule as well as the
Advisory Committee Note.49 In conclusion, the Court refused
to adopt “an atextual requirement” requiring heightened precertification proof of materiality by securities class action
plaintiffs.50
The Court employed a similarly textual mode of analysis in
its recent per curiam in Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississippi,
which summarily reversed a Fifth Circuit decision interpreting
Rule 8 in a section 1983 suit against a municipality.51 The
succinct, Ginsburgian opinion contrasts sharply with the tone
as well as the interpretive approach the Court employed in its
prior section 1983 pleading case, Ashcroft v. Iqbal—a paradigmatic managerial case discussed below.52 In Johnson, the
Court curtly (in two pages) dismisses the Fifth Circuit’s effort to
mandate that plaintiffs explicitly invoke section 1983 in their
46

Id.
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015)
(finding Rule 52’s standard of review to be a “clear command”); Marx v. Gen.
Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1172–73 (2013) (stating that the Court would
apply identical statutory construction to construe Rule 54 and to the FDCPA, and
using a treatise to support its textualist reading).
48
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013).
49
Id. at 1194–95 (quoting the Advisory Committee Note of 2003 for the proposition that “an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly
part of the certification decision”).
50
Id. at 1201.
51
135 S. Ct. 346 (2014).
52
Id. at 347 (distinguishing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as “not in point”).
47
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complaints. Finding no such requirement in the text of Rule 8,
the Court sends a clear message to lower courts to avoid reading Iqbal and Twombly as mandating “a punctiliously stated
‘theory of the pleadings.’”53 Instead, the Court in Johnson
harks back to its pre-Twombly decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County,54 which stated bluntly that Rule 8 “meant what it
said.”55 Thus, even in cases addressing key gatekeeper Rules,
the Court sometimes treats the Federal Rules as simply another form of statute—one that it is not free to amend outside of
the rulemaking process.56
Importantly, even when the Court construes the Rules as
statutes, the language of a particular Rule may require a fair
degree of discretion in that interpretation. In such instances,
the Court is still operating in the realm of statutory interpretation, but with strong undertones of pragmatism.57 Thus, in
Mayle v. Felix, the Court construed the scope of relation back
under Rule 15(c)(2) as it applied to a pro se prisoner’s habeas
petition.58 Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion conflicted
sharply with the dissent by Justice Souter over the meaning of
Rule 15(c)(2)’s requirement that a new claim, in order to relate
back, must “[arise] out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence” in the original pleading.59 The Court’s interpretation of
this language was complicated by the collateral constraints of
the habeas process, particularly including the habeas rule that
requires heightened specificity in pleading, and the one-year
statute of limitations on habeas claims imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.60 Ultimately, the majority construed the “transaction” language of Rule 15
narrowly, largely based on its reading of the tight restrictions
that it believed Congress intended to place on habeas review.61
53

Id.
Id. (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).
55
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
56
See, e.g., id. (instructing that modification of Rule 8 must come from the
rulemaking process rather than from interpretation).
57
Cf. John F. Manning, The New Purposovism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119
(2011) (noting that even nontextualist justices “rely on the text to structure and
constrain their sense of purpose” in statutory cases).
58
545 U.S. 644 (2005).
59
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
60
Mayle, 545 U.S. at 648–49.
61
Id. at 664 (concluding that a constrained reading of Rule 15 “is consistent
with the general application of Rule 15(c)(2) in civil cases, . . . with Habeas Corpus
Rule 2(c), . . . and with AEDPA’s installation of a tight time line for [section] 2254
petitions”).
54
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The dissent, finding the language of Rule 15 ambiguous, would
have chosen a broader construction.62 But both the majority
and the dissent, notwithstanding reaching different conclusions, were engaged in the activity of interpreting the text and
the intended purpose of Rule 15.
Analogously, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Company engaged in a statutory interpretation of Rule 23.63 The plurality
concluded that the unambiguous language of Rule 23 displaces state procedural rules that might otherwise limit the
Rule’s scope.64 In contrast to this clean and simple (perhaps
over-simple) statutory interpretation of Rule 23, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent took a more managerial approach, consistent with her nuanced approach to Erie questions, under which
the Court must interpret federal procedural law with “sensitivity to important state interests.”65 Thus, Justice Scalia’s plurality treats the interpretation as a matter of routine statutory
interpretation and draws a convenient though artificial line
between procedure and substance. In contrast, the dissent
finds ambiguity that requires a narrower, politically sensitive
construction of the Rule. Arguably the clash between the plurality’s textualism and the dissent’s contextualism still takes
place within the realm of traditional statutory interpretation
theory, but Justice Ginsburg’s delicate construction of Rule 23
shades into the norm-setting managerial interpretation described in the next section.
B. Managerial Interpretation
Notwithstanding what appears to be a consensus that the
Court will treat Rules the same as it does statutes, several of
the Roberts Court’s procedural rulings evince a contradictory
mode of interpretation, one that is rooted less in the Rules and
more in the Court’s inherent power of adjudication.66 When it
is acting in this gestalt, mother-knows-best mode, the Court
62
Id. at 676 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that “this case requires us to
apply text that is ambiguous,” and disagreeing with the Court’s resolution of that
ambiguity).
63
559 U.S. 393 (2011).
64
Id. at 398–400 (finding that plain text of Rule 23 mandates availability of
class action to plaintiffs who meet the Rule’s criteria).
65
Id. at 442 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
427 n.7 (1996)).
66
See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 324, 332–33 (2006) (explaining that the Court uses supervisory
power to “announce procedural rules not otherwise required by Congress or the
Constitution”); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Stat-
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significantly downplays the text of the Rules and gives short (or
no) shrift to the Advisory Committee Notes. Decisions in this
vein, like those above, feel familiar—but not in a statutory way:
these decisions follow the rhetorical and structural traditions
of equity, and the interpretive dynamism of the common law.
While it might be possible to describe these cases as examples
of Professor Eskridge’s “dynamic” statutory interpretation,67
such a label stretches the term so far as to render it almost
meaningless. In these cases the Court is not merely interpreting the Rules. Like enterprising trial courts, in managerial
mode the Roberts Court is strategizing and innovating to
achieve normative goals. Whereas in statutory mode the Court
tends to seek clarity and uniformity, its managerial cases seem
almost willfully equivocal. Where the Court’s statutory cases
defer to the rulemaking process, in managerial mode the Court
uses adjudication to re-set the rulemaking agenda. Among
these managerial cases are the watershed Rules decisions of
the Roberts Court.
In addition to Wal-Mart, discussed above,68 the twin symbols of managerial Rules interpretation are the Court’s pleading cases, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Iqbal v.
Ashcroft.69 Twombly candidly replaces the Court’s longstanding, broad interpretation of Rule 8 in Conley v. Gibson70 with a
new, much more discretionary gloss, under which a plaintiff’s
claims must pass “the line between possibility and plausibility.”71 As it eviscerates Conley, the Court in Twombly barely
glances at the text of Rule 8.72 In particular, the Court does not
cite Rule 8(a), which mandates that pleadings “be construed so
as to do justice.”73 Its textual analysis is primarily confined to
its statement—in a footnote—rebutting the argument that the
Court is effectively broadening Rule 9 to include antitrust cases
within the other categories of claims that require heightened
ute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (describing “equity of the statute” theory of
interpretation which advocates this claim is grounded in inherent judicial power).
67
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (arguing that “[s]tatutes . . . should—like the Constitution
and the common law—be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context”).
68
See supra notes 16–23 and accompanying text.
69
550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
70
355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
71
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
72
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (calling for “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); see also Dodson, supra note 37, at
297 (stating that Justice Souter in Twombly “only casually relied upon Rule 8’s
textual requirement”).
73
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
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specificity in pleading.74 Moreover, rather than cite the Advisory Committee Note on Rule 8, the Court instead cites a separate Advisory Committee report on the expense of discovery.75
Similarly, Iqbal makes only a faint attempt to link its analysis
to the text of Rule 8, tying its reasoning loosely to Rule 8’s
statement that the plaintiff “show” entitlement to relief implies
the plausibility requirement.76 Nowhere does Iqbal refer to the
Advisory Committee Notes or to any other aspect of the
rulemaking process. The majority in Iqbal seems far more preoccupied with protecting the right of government officials to be
free from the burden of litigation.77 In these cases, the Court is
not approaching Rule 8 with the statutory tools that it employs
in run-of-the-mine cases interpreting a legislative text.78 Instead, in the classic common-law manner, the Court canvasses
precedent and scholarship, policy and (its view of) purpose, to
arrive at a new, twenty-first century pleading norm—
plausibility.79
Scott v. Harris is perhaps the next most infamous Rules
case that embodies managerial interpretation.80 In Scott—a
section 1983 suit against a police officer who rammed the
plaintiff’s vehicle after the plaintiff fled from a traffic stop—the
Court altered the summary judgment standard in light of a
video from the police car’s dashboard camera. Examining the
case in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the
plaintiff, the district court, and the court of appeals denied
summary judgment to the defendant police officer.81 The Supreme Court reversed, on the ground that the videotape rendered the plaintiff’s version of the facts a “visible fiction” that
no reasonable juror could believe.82 In the presence of the
video, the Court held, the court of appeals should have altered
the summary judgment standard: rather than examining the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “it should have
74

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14.
Id. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory
Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)).
76
Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (stating that complaint “has not
‘show[n]’” entitlement to relief).
77
Id. at 685.
78
Indeed, the Court in Conley approached the question in a similar way, with
only passing reference to Rule 8. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957).
79
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59 (citing scholarship documenting expense of
abusive antitrust discovery).
80
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
81
See id. at 376.
82
Id. at 380–81.
75
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viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”83 Given
the proliferation of video technology, this view of Rule 56 has
the potential to alter the standard of review in the many instances in which there is visual evidence.84 But the Court in
Scott did not stop with that single disruption of a legal standard. Rather than remand the case for reconsideration of the
officer’s summary judgment motion in light of the video, the
Court in Scott interpreted the video itself and held that the
defendant police officer had not violated the Fourth Amendment.85 The Court did not merely advise the lower courts; it
assumed their role.
The Roberts Court has also taken a managerial approach
in less famous Rules decisions. Both Horne v. Flores and Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel arise out of Rules that, like
class actions, have equitable roots: Rule 60(b)’s relief from
judgment in Horne, and Rule 19’s compulsory joinder in Pimentel.86 It therefore makes sense that the Rules’ text is somewhat capacious and that the Court’s interpretation would aim
to capture the Rules’ purpose—their equitable essence.87 But
both Horne and Flores go further: these decisions use this purposive inquiry in order to explicitly alter or reinforce antilitigation norms that extend far beyond the text or purpose of the
Rules at issue.
In Horne v. Flores, the Court used Rule 60(b)(5) as a departure point for an extended critique of (almost a rant against)
institutional reform litigation, i.e., litigation that requires judicial oversight of a consent decree or other order in order to
83

Id. at 381.
See Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687,
1767–68 (2014) (describing impact of Scott and noting that “the impulse expressed by the Court—that photo evidence should trump legal presumptions—
indicates a real danger that multimedia advocacy will erode traditional decisionmaking structures”).
85
Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 (“Judging the matter [in light of the videotape], we
think it is quite clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
86
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009); Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel
553 U.S. 851 (2008); see Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation After
Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2012) (explaining that 60(b)
was intended to reflect longstanding judicial practice of courts using “inherent
equity power to grant relief” from judgment); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 923 (1987) (showing that many of the Rules,
including Rule 19, are the product of equitable considerations).
87
See Manning, supra note 66, at 8 (describing scholarly literature supporting “the equity of the statute,” an allegedly ancient common-law model of statutory interpretation under which judges had broad equitable powers to construe a
statute in order to effect its purpose).
84
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ensure institutional compliance with the law.88 Rule 60(b)(5)
does not directly address institutional litigation; it permits relief from a judgment if “applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable.”89 Almost thirty years prior to Horne, the Court had
recognized 60(b)(5) as a possible vehicle for modification or
abrogation of an institutional reform consent decree, but it had
cautioned against using the Rule as a loophole to escape enforcement.90 Although not explicitly overruling that precedent,
a sharply divided Court in Horne took the opposite stance,
practically inviting those operating under consent decrees to
file 60(b)(5) motions and strongly signaling lower courts to get
out of the business of institutional reform, which it described
in no uncertain terms as antithetical to federalist and democratic values.91 Despite characterizing its decision as adhering
to a “flexible approach,” the Court made clear that such “flexibility” had but one purpose: to return oversight responsibility
to state and federal officials as soon as possible.92 Horne has
received remarkably little scholarly attention, but one commentator described it as a “categorical and unilateral reinterpretation of Rule 60(b)(5).”93
Like in Horne, the Court in Pimentel uses a Federal Rule as
a springboard to reinforce an extrinsic norm—this time, the
immunity of sovereigns from suit. In dismissing an interpleader action seeking assets to enforce a judgment in favor of
a plaintiff class against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos for
widespread human rights violations, the Court found that the
lower courts had given short shrift to the sovereign immunity of
88
See also David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big
Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1018 (2004).
89
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). But this Article employs the term to describe not
the Rules themselves, but rather the mode of analysis the Court selects (typically
without explaining why) when it confronts a Rule-centered question. In housekeeping mode, the Court tends to rely on the same methods of interpretation that
it applies when it interprets statutes.
90
See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992) (stating
that Rule 60(b)(5) provides relief only when enforcement is no longer equitable,
“not when it is no longer convenient,” and placing on the party seeking revision
the “burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants
revision of the decree”).
91
Horne, 557 U.S. at 448 (stating that “institutional reform injunctions often
raise sensitive federalism concerns”); id. at 449 (“Injunctions of this sort bind
state and local officials to the policy preferences of their predecessors and may
thereby ‘improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.’” (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004))).
92
Id. at 449 (“A flexible approach allows courts to ensure that ‘responsibility
for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its
officials.’” (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004))).
93
See Kim, supra note 86, at 1435.
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the defendants, and the comity and dignity inherent in sovereignty.94 The Court concluded that “where sovereign immunity
is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign are not frivolous,
dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the interests of the absent sovereign.”95 In a
subsequent case on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the
Court confirmed this broad prosovereign principle.96 As one
scholar has noted, with its weighty emphasis on sovereignty
“the Court gestured to concerns not easily located within the
text of Rule 19.”97
Finally, the outcome of the Court’s decision in a pending
case concerning Rule 68, Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez,
is likely to turn on the Court’s interpretive approach to Rule 68.
In Gomez, the question is whether a plaintiff’s claim becomes
moot—and therefore nonjusticiable—when the defendant
makes a Rule 68 offer of judgment that grants the plaintiff
complete relief, and whether the result is the same if the offer of
judgment applies to a named plaintiff in a putative class action.98 In responding, the Court could interpret Rule 68 according to its plain language, which says nothing about a
plaintiff’s case becoming moot under such circumstances. Indeed, in a recent dissent Justice Kagan characterized what she
perceived as the Court’s belief that a plaintiff’s claim in such a
situation would be rendered moot as “wrong, wrong, and wrong
again.”99 According to Justice Kagan, “An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect.”100 Yet the malleable, judicially
created doctrines of justiciability make it very likely that in
Gomez a majority of the Court will not be confined to the text of
Rule 68 or to the background rules governing settlement.
When judge-made doctrines such as mootness and ripeness

94
Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 865–66 (2008) (stating
that the court gave “insufficient weight to their sovereign status”).
95
Id. at 867.
96
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324 (2010).
97
Katherine Florey, Making Sovereigns Indispensable: Pimentel and the
Evolution of Rule 19, 58 UCLA L. REV. 667, 709 (2011).
98
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, No. 14-857
(2015) (Question Presented).
99
See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1533 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s decision is based on an implied
understanding of Rule 68 that is “wrong, wrong, and wrong again”).
100
Id.
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collide with the Rules, the Court has ample room to interject its
own preferences regarding litigation norms into the debate.101
***
As the above cases demonstrate, the Roberts Court’s Rules
decisions are not as erratic as they might seem; yet neither are
they reducible to a unitary, statutory methodology. To be sure,
sometimes the Court analyzes the Rules at arms’-length, treating them functionally as statutes. But in other instances the
Roberts Court rules from its common-law hip. The next Part
shows how these seeming inconsistencies are in fact intrinsic
to—and a healthy part of—the rulemaking structure.
II
THE FAULT LINES OF RULES INTERPRETATION
This Part identifies three tensions—interpretive fault
lines—in the structure of rulemaking and the Rules themselves
that together explain, and justify, the Roberts Court’s interpretive bipolarity. The first such fault line, described in subpart A,
arises from an institutional design that renders the Court’s
relationship to the Federal Rules inherently unstable. Subpart
B documents a second set of inherent tensions, this time in the
structure and text of the Rules themselves. Finally, subpart C
argues that a third, epistemological instability—the perpetually puzzling tension between procedure and substance, between trans-substantivity and particularity—gives rise to, and
reinforces, the two paradigms of Rules interpretation.
A. Institutional
The Federal Rules date to 1938. Surprisingly, however,
scholars have not reached consensus on the Court’s role in the
rulemaking process, or on the related question of the relationship between the Court’s rulemaking role (however that might
be defined) and its Article III powers of adjudication.102 The
Court’s dual roles as legislative rulemaker and judicial adjudi101
For an excellent analysis of the Rule 68 issue, see Bradley Girard, Note,
Don’t Try This at Home: The Troubling Distortion of Rule 68, 103 GEO. L.J. 723
(2015).
102
See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial
Rulemaking, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 447, 449 (2013) (noting that one source of unease
with the rulemaking process is the Court’s tendency to “engage[ ] in amendment
by case law instead of through the [rulemaking] process”).
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cator complicate any understanding of Rules interpretation.103
While this dual role arguably violates “fundamental principles
of separation of powers,”104 it is an inherent and unquestioned
aspect of the Court’s relationship to the Rules.105
Contrasting scholarly narratives have emerged—narratives
that also manifest in the Court’s Rules decisions.106 One narrative depicts the Court as a paramount force in the legislative
process creating the Rules.107 The other narrative, drawing a
forceful analogy to administrative agencies, argues that the
robust administrative process for rulemaking that Congress
established in 1988, combined with the Court’s historical lassitude in rulemaking, together dictate that the Court should refrain from rulemaking by adjudication and instead defer to the
administrative process, by which scholars mean the process of
rulemaking by committees.108 The problem with these competing narratives is that both contain important elements of truth,
but neither tell the whole story. It is correct that the Court is
only one element of the rulemaking process, and that the Court
should not flout that process by judicial fiat in the course of
adjudication. Simultaneously, however, the Court has broad
power to interpret texts, including the Rules, when it decides
cases, and that interpretive power is an important and valuable
voice in the shaping of the Rules. The unresolved tension between these two visions of the Court’s role creates a fault line in
Rules interpretation—one that ultimately supports both of the
Court’s methodologies for interpreting the Rules.

103
See Bauer, supra note 5, at 720 (“In construing the Federal Rules, the
courts are interpreting standards which the Supreme Court itself has
promulgated.”).
104
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring); see also Order of Jan. 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 870 (1963) (Black
& Douglas, JJ.) (describing “the embarrassment of having to sit in judgment on
. . . rules which we have approved and which as applied in given situations might
have to be declared invalid”).
105
See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules
Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (2006) (noting that, “as a practical
matter,” the Enabling Act’s constitutionality is not in doubt, but nevertheless
arguing that the Act gives rise to “serious constitutional difficulties”).
106
See infra Section II.A.2.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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1. The Court’s Uncertain Role
The Court plainly has some power in creating and interpreting the Federal Rules; the question is how much.109 Unfortunately, neither the formal rulemaking structure nor the
practices of the Court with regard to rulemaking provide a clear
answer.
At one level, the answer should be simple: the Court is in
charge of the Rules. In the Enabling Act, Congress granted the
Court such rulemaking authority, subject only to congressional acquiescence and the limitation in section 2072(b) that
the rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.”110 Beneath this broad grant of power, however, is a
more complex, more administrative reality. The Court has
never itself performed the heavy lifting of rulemaking.111 Thus,
in 1958 the Court advocated in favor of the formation of the
Judicial Conference to assist with rulemaking, and in addition
the Court has always employed an Advisory Committee, composed primarily of judges and academics, to initiate the drafting process.112
109
See Moore, supra note 5, at 1045 (observing that “embedded in this outwardly simple statutory framework for the promulgation of the Rules is the resolution of a major separation of powers controversy”).
110
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012) (empowering the Court “to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure” for cases in federal district courts and
courts of appeals). With rare exceptions, Congress has deferred to the Rules
transmitted by the Court for its acquiescence. See infra note 116 and accompanying text; see also Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1018–19 (1982) (noting the lack of interference from Congress in the
Court’s promulgation of procedural rules). It has chosen instead to focus its
regulation of the courts on threshold jurisdictional questions through the use of
jurisdictional statutes. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) (supplemental jurisdictional statute that codifies—with some modifications—the prior court-created
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction). The outer limits of this limitation
are uncertain, and the Court has applied an “REA avoidance canon”—i.e., a
practice of interpreting the Rules in such a way as to reaffirm their compliance
with the REA. See generally Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (describing history of the REA); see also Struve,
supra note 5, at 1102 (explaining the avoidance canon as “the Court giv[ing] the
Rules a presumption of validity, but constru[ing] them so as to avoid [violating the
REA’s restrictions]”).
111
See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of
Federal Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 274 (2009) (noting that when the REA
passed, “no one expected the Supreme Court itself to draft and promulgate the
Rules”); Marcus, supra note 5, at 931 (noting that the Court formed the Advisory
Committee “[o]n its own initiative” to draft the rules and that the committee has
existed except during a brief period from 1956-1958 when the Court disbanded it
for undocumented reasons).
112
Notably, the Court supported formation of the Judicial Conference. See
H.R. REP. NO. 85-1670, at 4 (1958) (letter of Warren Olney III, Director of Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, to Hon. Sam Rayburn, speaker of the House, stating that
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Congressional enactments in the 1980s further removed
the Court from the nitty-gritty of the rulemaking process by
mandating additional layers of review—bringing the total to
seven steps—and inviting greater public participation.113 As a
key element of these changes, the Enabling Act inserted a new
review body between the Advisory Committee and the Judicial
Conference. Congress charged this new body, called the
Standing Committee, with holding public meetings to communicate its review and analysis of any proposed changes to the
Rules.114 The Judicial Conference further refined this process,
mandating that the initial rulemaking body, the Advisory Committee, provide notice of any proposed changes in the Federal
Register, followed by a period of six months for public comment, including public hearings.115 In light of these refinements—some implemented by Congress, and some by the
Judicial Conference—the judicial rulemaking process now
more closely resembles the rulemaking process in administrative agencies. But while these modifications are clearly intended to make the rulemaking process more transparent,
more accountable to the public, and presumably more effective, it is unclear what effect, if any, this revised process has on
the Court’s formal rulemaking power. In theory, Congress can
also override the administrative process, but in practice it has
done so rarely.116
the Court could not itself spend the time and resources necessary for continuous
study of the rules); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675–76 (1975) (observing that “judges
. . . are busy and cannot be expected to have the time to draft reform proposals;
they therefore delegate that task to commissions, usually composed chiefly of
legal scholars and senior lawyers”).
113
See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4649 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006)) (repealing and replacing the prior 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
114
28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2012) (stating that the standing committee “shall
review each recommendation of any other committees so appointed and recommend to the Judicial Conference rules of practice, procedure, and evidence . . . as
may be necessary to maintain consistency and otherwise promote the interest of
justice”); id. at (c)(1) (open meeting requirement); id. at (d) (requirement to create
report). The REA revisions also put Rules changes on a formalized schedule,
requiring the Court to transmit any proposed changes to Congress by May 1. 28
U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012).
115
See Notice of Public Hearings, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,752 (Apr. 5, 1989); see also
id. at 13,753 (noting that in rare instances, where “the administration of justice”
so requires, the time period and hearing requirement may be modified or
eliminated).
116
Congress has only occasionally reacted to Federal Rules. See Robert G.
Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy,
and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 908 (1999) (observing that under the
traditional model “Congress will exercise its veto power under the Rules Enabling
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Further obscuring the Court’s formal role in the rulemaking process, the Court’s practical role is not well understood—
in large part because there is a dearth of data.117 One justice
has described the Court’s role as “perfunctory,”118 and another
stated that the Court’s approval of proposed Rules is “more a
certification that they are the products of proper procedures
than a considered judgment on the merits of the proposals
themselves.”119 But there is no way to know if those descriptions will hold uniformly true over time or among justices. Unlike the Advisory Committee, the Court does not conduct its
deliberations in public.120 Instead, the Court’s approach to
evaluating proposed changes to the Rules appears to mirror its
black-box certiorari process:121 the Court may reject a proposed rule change (refusing to transmit it to Congress) without
explanation, just as it does the overwhelming majority of certiorari petitions it reviews; it may transmit Rule changes to Congress without comment, signaling either neutrality,
enthusiasm, or a mix of views among the nine justices (somewhat similar to the Court’s typical grant, which does not technically signal the Court’s predisposition on the merits); or, on
rare occasions, the Court may transmit proposed Rule changes
to Congress with accompanying statements by one or more
justices, just as occasionally justices write separate statements
on denial of certiorari. In this certiorari-like process, the Advisory Committee Notes appear to function as a clerk’s cert-pool
Act only rarely”); Moore, supra note 5, at 1053–54 (describing rare situations
where Congress delayed the implementation of a rule, rejected, or modified a rule).
117
See Moore, supra note 5, at 1064 (noting that “deliberations on proposed
rule changes are secret”).
118
Dissent of Justice Douglas to the Court’s approval of the proposed Rules of
Evidence. 34 L. Ed.2d lxvi (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119
Order of Apr. 29, 1980, 446 U.S. 997, 998 n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Friedenthal, supra note 112, at 676 (stating that “[i]t seems clear
that the Justices relied completely on the work of the Advisory Committee” and
describing the Court as “lulled into complacency” by congressional acquiescence);
Marcus, supra note 5, at 961 (“Although they have formal roles, the Judicial
Conference, Supreme Court, and Congress act largely as rubber stamps in the
rulemaking process.”).
120
See Struve, supra note 5, at 1154 (noting that “the extent to which a
majority of the Court even considers the merits of a proposed Rule is unclear”).
Documents memorializing the Court’s rulemaking considerations might appear in
a Justice’s papers, but under current law such papers are the private property of
the individual Justices. See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers,
99 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1686 (2013) (noting that federal judges have exclusive,
private ownership rights over their papers and advocating for a different model
that would grant some public access to these documents).
121
For a description of the Court’s process for granting certiorari, see Kathryn
A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 7–18 (2011).
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memo: vital to the efficiency of the process, yet utterly
nonbinding.122
Finally, to the extent that they feel constrained by the formal or cultural limitations of rulemaking, members of the
Court may believe they have little choice but to communicate
their views through adjudication, a realm in which their power
and skills are unquestionable.123 This appears to have been
the case with Rule 8. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, the Court adhered respectfully to the text of Rules 8 and 9, but it also unmistakably
communicated that it believed some reform of the pleading
standards to be necessary.124 Ultimately, however, despite
much debate, the Advisory Committee took no action.125 In the
face of such inertia,
[l]ike a bull in a china closet, the Court came crashing in and
said, in effect, to rulemakers: out of my way. Can’t you see
that modern litigation is totally different from what it was in
1938? Why haven’t you done something by now?126

Ironically, then, the Court’s position at the top of the administrative hierarchy effectively cuts it out of the process of initial
revisions of Rules.127 Given these constraints, it is logical that
the Court would use its most powerful tool—adjudication—to
contribute its voice to the agenda and process.
Finally, the details of the rulemaking process—whether robust or thin, whether designed by the Judicial Conference or by
122
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating his opinion that “[t]he Advisory Committee’s insights into the
proper interpretation of a Rule’s text are useful to the same extent as any scholarly commentary,” but noting that “the Committee’s intentions have no effect on
the Rule’s meaning”).
123
Individual Justices might speak out in speeches, books, or—in rare instances—directly to Congress, but generally the Justices are reticent about
speaking out about any non-case-related topics. See Richard A. Posner, The
Supreme Court and Celebrity Culture, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299, 299–300 (2013)
(describing most justices as “pretty much wallflowers” but noting as an exception
the “Hughes-Brandeis letter to Congress in 1937 obliquely criticizing Roosevelt’s
Court-packing plan”).
124
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (speculating that resolution of the case would be
different if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten, but “that is a result which must be
obtained by the [rulemaking] process . . . .”).
125
See Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1503–11 (2013) (describing unsuccessful attempts by
rulemakers to reach consensus on revising Rule 8).
126
Id. at 1512 (emphasis omitted).
127
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1205 n.98 (acknowledging
that “the current court rulemaking model is best described as a bottom-up process, whereas agency rulemaking is traditionally described as a top-down
process”).

R
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Congress—do not necessarily provide much insight into the
methodologies appropriate to interpret the Rules once they are
promulgated and the subject of a live controversy.
2. Clashing Narratives
Given the ambiguities over the scope of the Court’s legislative and adjudicative power over the Rules, it is hardly surprising that the handful of scholars to have examined the Court’s
interpretive power over the last thirty years have subscribed to
sharply different visions. Scholars in the 1980s and 1990s,
frustrated with the Court’s new emphasis on textualism in its
Rules decisions, construed the rulemaking structure as conferring enormous power on the Court to liberally interpret the
Rules.128 In contrast, more recent scholarly analyses—reacting to the Court’s perceived disrespect for the Rules’ text—have
argued that the rulemaking structure requires the Court to
exercise interpretive restraint.129 These opposing views of the
Court’s role and responsibility correspond precisely with the
two opposing paradigms of the Roberts Court’s Rules
interpretation.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s—frustrated with what
they perceived to be an emergent trend in the Court toward a
rigid textualist interpretation of the Federal Rules—two scholars argued that the Court has not only broad power to interpret
the Rules, but a concomitant responsibility to use that power to
effectuate the due process purposes of the Rules.130 According
to these scholars’ view, both under the Enabling Act and as a
matter of inherent adjudicative power, the Court is ultimately
in charge of the Rules. Although it might seem incongruous for
the Court to engage in legislative activity, the congressional
delegation of power in the Enabling Act removes any constitutional taint.131 As a later commentator framed it, “Why should
128
See generally Bauer, supra note 5, at 726 (justifying “liberal interpretation”
of the rules); Moore, supra note 5, at 1040 (arguing for “more activist role for the
Court in interpreting the [rules]”).
129
See generally Marcus, supra note 5, at 929 (an interpreter of the rules
should defer to the rulemakers’ intent and “resist[ ] the urge to let its own preferences drive textual application”); Struve, supra note 5, at 1102 (“Congress’s delegation of rulemaking authority should constrain, rather than liberate, courts’
interpretation of the Rules.”).
130
See Bauer, supra note 5, at 720 (criticizing the Court’s “unnecessarily
grudging” interpretation of Rule 15(c)); Moore, supra note 5, at 1085 (criticizing
use of plain meaning interpretation in Rules cases as “misguided, unwarranted,
and inappropriate”).
131
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 24 (1985) (arguing there is no separation of powers objection to
federal courts adopting rules for internal operation or for control of litigation); id.
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the Court—ostensibly the rulemaking principal by the terms of
the Rules Enabling Act—have to defer to what the Court itself
forges?”132 In the view of Joseph Bauer and Karen Nelson
Moore, the Court’s dual role as legislator and adjudicator of the
Rules expands, rather than constrains, the Court’s power.133
It is widely understood that the Court’s interpretation of statutes is based upon its role as a “faithful agent” of Congress.134
But in the context of the Rules—where the Court has independent authorial power—the faithful agent metaphor is not a perfect fit. As Bauer stated:
In construing the Federal Rules, the courts are interpreting
standards which the Supreme Court itself has promulgated.
Therefore, some of the problems which occur during statutory interpretation, such as ferreting out legislative intent,
deferring to another branch of government, or avoiding violations of principles of federalism by deferring to state interests, are in large measure eliminated.135

Bauer was writing in 1988, so his perspective may not have
taken Congress’s significant 1988 modifications to the
rulemaking procedure into account. In 1993, however, Moore
took the same position, concluding that, “[g]iven these substantial, although largely unexercised, powers of the Court in
the promulgation process, a more activist role in the interpretative stage, one that considers purpose and policy, is
appropriate.”136
at 41 (arguing that when a “delegation of lawmaking power” to the judiciary is
intentional and circumscribed, “it does not violate the principles of federalism,
separation of powers, or electoral accountability”). Reflecting upon separation of
powers concerns regarding judicial rulemaking, Judge Weinstein has observed,
“The rule-making power is one of the most important examples of practical necessity dictating that a twilight area be created where activities of the separate
branches merge.” JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES
54 (1977) (citation omitted).
132
Marcus, supra note 5, at 942.
133
Bauer, supra note 5, at 727 (arguing that “it is the Supreme Court itself
which has been given the responsibility for promulgating and implementing the
Rules”); Moore, supra note 5, at 1093 (“Congress has explicitly delegated to the
Court rulemaking power, and it is not inconsistent to imply the Court has greater
power to interpret Rules than it does to interpret statutes.”).
134
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the
role of courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the
legislature.”).
135
Bauer, supra note 5, at 720.
136
Moore, supra note 5, at 1093; cf. Marcus, supra note 5, at 929 (arguing, by
contrast, that “as a functional matter, a court should pursue the same interpretive goal for the Federal Rules that the faithful agent concept recommends for
courts as they interpret statutes”).
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Moore, who urged the Court to take “a more activist role in
interpreting the Federal Rules,”137 remains the staunchest
scholarly voice in favor of this broad view of the Court’s interpretive power. Rather than confining itself the text of the
Rules138 or the Advisory Committee Notes,139 Moore maintained that the Court should reject textualism in favor of contextualism—a broader inquiry into the purposes and policy
surrounding a Rule.140 She also concluded that the Court
should interpret the Rules dynamically, to establish legal
norms and to preserve the Rules’ flexibility.141 Echoing Moore
and Bauer, other scholars have similarly criticized “rules formalism”—a tendency of the Court to hide behind statutory interpretation of the Rules in order to deflect responsibility for its
decision onto the rulemaking process rather than openly debating the relevant legal norms.142 These criticisms were responses to the issue of the time—a perception that the Court
was interpreting the Rules grudgingly in order to limit their
usefulness as tools to solve important litigation problems.
More recently, in response to a different problem—namely,
a perception that the Court is ignoring the Rules in favor of its
own policy preferences—a handful of scholars have taken the
opposite stance. In their view, the rulemaking structure con137

Moore, supra note 5, at 1093.
Id. at 1084 (concluding that “it is not appropriate or adequate to focus
exclusively on a plain meaning analysis, except in those rare cases in which the
Rules text is unquestionably explicit with respect to the issue in question”).
139
Id. at 1094.
140
See id. (“It is possible that the Court, in adopting a particular Rule, had a
different view of purpose or policy that may or may not have been expressed
publicly and that should be considered when interpreting a Rule.”). This argument notably does not take into account that the members of the Court change
over time and that there is no requirement that the Court maintain public (or
private) records of its reasoning beyond what it transmits to Congress. See
Struve, supra note 5, at 1154 (noting that “the extent to which a majority of the
Court even considers the merits of a proposed Rule is unclear”). Documents
memorializing the Court’s rulemaking considerations might appear in a Justice’s
papers, but under current law such papers are the private property of the individual Justices. See generally Watts, Judges, supra note 120, at 1686 (arguing that
the private ownership model of judicial papers should be abandoned).
141
See Moore, supra note 5, at 1094–95 (“Rules should be interpreted to
reflect changed circumstances.”).
142
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 351 (“The retreat to rules formalism in both
Amchem and Ortiz is unfortunate because it implies that the failure to resort to
the formal processes of rule amendment is what doomed the proposed settlement
class resolution of asbestos litigation.”).
138
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strains, rather than empowers, the Court,143 and therefore
rulemaking, rather than adjudication, should set procedural
norms.144 These scholars are part of an emerging trend in
which scholars seek to constrain the Court’s adjudicative
power by analogizing the Court to an administrative agency.145
While earlier scholars urged the Court to use its adjudicative
power to set legal norms, the purpose of the agency analogy is
to delegitimize the Court’s managerial interpretive practices
and to put significant limits on the Court’s influence over the
Rules.
Over a decade ago, Catherine Struve led the vanguard of
the trend toward emphasizing the agency-like qualities of the
Court as a rulemaker. To Struve, the 1988 amendments to the
Enabling Act represent an institutional turning point: a clear
signal that Congress intended to create a more transparent,
accountable process for vetting the Federal Rules—one that
significantly reduced the Court’s adjudicative power over policy
in favor of agency-like rulemaking.146 Both formally and practically, Struve championed the transparency and public participation of the post-1988 rulemaking structure,147 to the
tendency of judges to interpret the Rules “in light of their intuitions or policy preferences.”148 Echoing that sentiment, David
Marcus argues that the rulemaking committee’s expertise and
143

See Struve, supra note 5, at 1102.
Id. (“[A]lterations to the Rules should undergo the process specified in the
Enabling Act, rather than taking effect through judicial fiat.”).
145
See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural
Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683, 687 (2014) (examining “the problem of managing litigation through an administrative law lens”); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24,
at 1194 (“[T]he Supreme Court functions much like an administrative agency
when it makes law in the field of civil procedure.”); Watts, supra note 121, at 6
(suggesting that “both certiorari and administrative law involve the same underlying concerns of accountability and reasoned decisionmaking”).
146
See Struve, supra note 5, at 1105 (noting that the 1988 amendments
manifest “a trend away from unilateral Supreme Court decision making and toward a process that includes multiple gatekeepers”); see also Marcus, supra note
5, at 933–34 (“The 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act ensure that
significant changes to the Federal Rules benefit from a multi-layered, open, and
expert-driven process.”); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1200 (observing that “[t]he 1988 Act also increased representation and public participation in
the rulemaking process”).
147
Marcus, supra note 5, at 947 (stating that opportunity for public comment
and practice of searching for consensus “strengthen the legitimacy of procedural
rulemaking by a metric of deliberative democracy”); Struve, supra note 5, at 1110
(noting that the Advisory Committee’s composition “ensures that at least some
practitioners, as well as a number of judges, will be involved in the rulemaking
process”); id. at 1125 (arguing that delegation to the judiciary “privileges the
decisions of a less politically accountable branch”).
148
Struve, supra note 5, at 1137–38; see also Marcus, supra note 5, at 946.
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access to public input render them far better suited than the
Court to establishing litigation norms through Rules.149
In depicting the Court as an agency for purposes of
rulemaking, Struve and others aim to severely limit the Court’s
power over the Rules, both as a rulemaker and as an adjudicator. In a traditional administrative agency, the head of the
agency sets the agenda—a top-down process.150 But in the
Court-as-agency model, rulemaking is driven almost exclusively by the fourteen-member Advisory Committee at the very
bottom rung of the administrative ladder.151 The Court, in this
view, is practically just another member of the public: “Though
the Court, like other entities, can suggest changes for the
rulemakers’ consideration, it cannot promulgate such changes
against the wishes of the other participants in the rulemaking
process.”152 According to this view, the Court’s only remaining
power to influence the Rules is limited to suggesting changes
and—at the outside—vetoing a proposed rule with which it
disagrees.153 Although not stated directly, Mulligan, Struve,
and others appear to assume that the Advisory Committee’s
members—and therefore the rulemaking process—will be more
proplaintiff than the five-Justice majority of the Court behind
Iqbal, Wal-Mart, and other controversial decisions, and therefore will refrain from amending the Rules in ways similar to
what the Court is doing through adjudication. While perhaps
true in the past, this assumption will not necessarily hold true
in the future, particularly in light of increased activism by con-

149
See Marcus, supra note 5, at 944 (arguing that rulemaking committees
have “procedural expertise that far outstrips that of the Court”).
150
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1205 n.98 (“[A]gency rulemaking
is traditionally described as a top-down process.” (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Public Law from the Bottom Up, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 141, 173–74 (1994))).
151
See Marcus, supra note 5, at 961 (“Although they have formal roles, the
Judicial Conference, Supreme Court, and Congress act largely as rubber stamps
in the rulemaking process.”).
152
Struve, supra note 5, at 1129–30; see also Mulligan & Staszewski, supra
note 24, at 1193 (arguing for “a presumption in favor of rulemaking for all civil
rules issues that do not rest upon a question of statutory interpretation”).
153
Struve, supra note 5, at 1127 (describing the Court’s role as merely a
“‘conduit’ from the rulemakers to Congress” and also noting that the Court’s veto
power under the REA “is not a mandate for subsequent revision”). Struve also
acknowledges that the Court—like all courts—has inherent rulemaking power.
Id. at 1131. But she argues that such amorphous power “should . . . be irrelevant
to the Court’s interpretation of a Rule.” Id. See infra Subpart II.B for a further
discussion of the impact of different forms of adjudicative power on the Court’s
role as interpreter of the Rules.
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servative groups during the public comment period of the
rulemaking process.154
In addition to narrowly defining the Court’s rulemaking
authority, Court-as-agency proponents propose tight restrictions on the Court’s interpretive powers. For example, in order
to give full effect to the intent of the rulemakers (by which she
does not mean the Court), Struve insists that the Advisory
Committee Notes should be binding on courts’ interpretations
of a Rule.155 In a similar vein, Lumen Mulligan and Glen Staszewski argue that if the Court cannot resolve a Rules question
by resort to traditional methods of statutory interpretation, or
when resolution of a question depends on legislative facts, the
Court should refrain from adjudication and instead refer the
question to the rulemaking process.156 Under this view, the
Court’s interpretive hands are largely tied.
3. The Power of Ambiguity
Each of the above narratives—especially when seen in contrast to the other—depicts a rather extreme view of the Court’s
power as a rulemaker and as an adjudicator. As such, neither
narrative is wholly convincing. The Court-centric theory advanced by Bauer and Moore does not adequately account for
Congress’s purposeful expansion of the rulemaking structure
154
Over one year ago, a conservative commentator urged interest groups to
make public comments on the proposed amendments to the discovery rules. See
Jon Kyl, A Rare Chance to Lower Litigation Costs: A Federal Committee Wants to
Hear Your Ideas on the Subject. Speak Up., WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2014, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579321003417505882
[http://perma.cc/3TCV-8EBW] (urging businesses to “provide the [Advisory] committee with meaningful comments explaining how the current discovery system
needs to be improved”). As Patricia Moore argued last September, the proposed
amendments to Rule 26(c) reflect those prodefense values. See Patricia W. Moore,
“Corporate and Defense Perspective” Prevails in the Proposed Step Toward CostShifting in Rule 26(c), CIV. PROC. AND FED. CTS. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2014), http://law
professors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/09/corporate-and-defense-perspective-pre
vails-in-the-proposed-step-toward-cost-shifting-in-rule-26c.html [http://
perma.cc/45X7-R8ZZ]; see also Patricia W. Moore, Proposed Rule 37(e): Failure to
Preserve Electronically Stored Information, CIV. PROC. AND FED. CTS. BLOG (Sept. 12,
2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/09/proposed-rule-37efailure-to-preserve-electronically-stored-information.html [http://perma.cc/
A9J3-6JUY](arguing that the proposed amendments to the discovery rules “include all three top priorities of the defense-oriented ‘Lawyers for Civil Justice,’” a
group that Moore demonstrated in her Sept. 11, 2014 post is closely tied to the
Federalist Society).
155
Struve, supra note 5, at 1152 (arguing that the Notes have “distinctive
claims to authority”); id. at 1158 (“[T]he Notes in some ways resemble text more
than legislative history.”); see also Marcus, supra note 5, at 929 (arguing that
“courts should defer to rulemaker expectations”).
156
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1215.
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to include greater public input into judicial policymaking. It
also places few, if any, constraints on the Court’s interpretation
of the Rules, leaving all such decisions within the discretion of
the Court itself. This view makes very little distinction between
the Court’s Rules decisions and its inherent supervisory powers. One scholar has criticized the Court and other scholars for
taking such supervisory powers for granted.157 The same is
true here. Neither Bauer nor Moore has a particularly complex
justification for their conclusions. What they have is a slim but
nevertheless persuasive tautology: the Court is the Court. The
Court is powerful. Ergo it is powerful.
On the other hand, the Court-as-agency proponents go too
far in their effort to enfeeble the Court vis-à-vis the Rules.
Understandably frustrated with the Court’s recent disruption
of litigation norms, these proponents aim to limit the interpretive tools on which the Court can legitimately rely in Rules
cases. In this sense, Struve and Mulligan downplay the inherent adjudicative power of the Court as head of the judicial
branch. In the realm of the Rules, they aim to relegate the
Court to a housekeeping role.158 At the same time, the agency
theory attempts to drastically minimize the Court’s role in the
rulemaking process. In so doing, these scholars fail sufficiently
to account for the Court’s delegated power under the Enabling
Act, which they have in essence imagined away. They also put
undue faith in the Advisory Committee which, despite receiving
significant public input, is not as politically accountable or as
responsive as they depict.159
Conversely, neither is the Court as path-marking in its
Rules decisions as is often depicted: far from writing on a clean
slate, it is engaged in a dialogue with lower courts, Congress,
157
See Barrett, supra note 66, at 325 (observing that, without reflection,
“[b]oth the Court and scholars . . . have assumed that the Court’s assertions of
supervisory authority are legitimate” exercises of “the inherent authority that
every federal court possesses over procedure”).
158
See generally Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of
Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 926–32 (1990) (decoding and
critiquing the law’s use of “housekeeping,” primarily as a way of labeling something as lesser or insignificant).
159
See Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial
Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 474 (2013) (The Committee is “[a] group
capable of leadership on significant issues [that] has too often failed to lead.”);
Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 429, 434 (2003) (observing that “[t]he Federal Rules have not been immune
to the complication, trivialization and ossification pathogens that have plagued
earlier procedural systems”); see also supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text
(describing the Advisory Committee’s inertia in the face of the Court’s stated
dissatisfaction with pleading standards).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN103.txt

2015]

unknown

PRAGMATISM RULES

Seq: 33

28-OCT-15

12:22

155

rulemakers, and the Bar. For example, although the Court’s
interpretation of Rule 8 in Twombly shocked commentators,
the concept of raised pleading standards was hardly a new one.
In addition to the Court’s pointed request that the Advisory
Committee consider revising Rule 8,160 in practice many district courts were already modifying the Conley standard as they
managed a wide variety of complex cases.161 In response to
these on-the-ground and from-the-top developments, the Committee had actually taken up proposals to heighten Rule 8’s
standards that very much resembled the path the Court took in
Twombly and Iqbal. Unable to reach consensus on change,
however, the Advisory Committee ultimately took no action.162
Finally, the Court-as-agency theory dramatically understates the Court’s expertise, as well as its power, in setting
policy through adjudication. Unlike agency heads or lower
courts, the Court has control over its docket. The essence of
certiorari is that the Court will select for review those few cases
that involve important, unresolved questions—questions that
inevitably have policy implications.163 Moreover, it is unclear
whether the Court would feel any degree of constraint from a
suggestion that it must either use traditional statutory interpretation tools or route a Rules interpretation question through
the rulemaking process. In the words of Thomas Merrill, even if
a federal statute “limits lawmaking by federal courts, it does
not necessarily follow that it prohibits all forms of textual interpretation.”164 In any case, if the Court wished to interpret a
Rule through adjudication, it could simply squeeze its policy
views through the lens of statutory interpretation.165 Short of
160

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Hoffman, supra note 125, at 1508–09 (describing comments of Judge Lee
Rosenthal, chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, stating that “lower courts
have appeared to continue to insist on heightened pleading in some cases, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s express directives to the contrary”).
162
See id. at 1487–88 (“Having repeatedly declined over the years to alter the
existing pleading rules, rulemakers suddenly faced a remarkable turn of events
starting in the summer of 2007 when the Court appeared to rewrite the rules
along lines very similar to those that rulemakers had consistently declined to
follow in the past.”).
163
See Watts, supra note 121, at 14–15 (observing that the Court’s “extreme
selectivity means that, in many ways, the process of ‘deciding to decide’ is just as
important as the Court’s decisions on the merits of cases, if not even more
important”).
164
Merrill, supra note 131, at 31.
165
For an example of this technique, see Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the
Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), which significantly shifted
summary judgment norms under the guise of a plain-language interpretation of
Rule 56.
161
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congressional intervention, it is difficult to see who, other than
the Court itself, would police that line.166
Yet notwithstanding weaknesses in these competing visions of the relationship of the Court to the Rules, both visions—of the Court as adjudicator-in-chief on one hand, and
as a rung on the technocratic ladder on the other—also capture
essential truths. Together, they reveal the strangely conflicted
position the Court occupies as it straddles its dual responsibilities. These scholarly theses also reveal the Court’s lack of
transparency and self-reflection about its two roles. What is
interesting about Rules interpretation isn’t the controversy
surrounding the debate, but the relative paucity of debate.
Paradoxically, however, because both of these views have significant elements of truth—and because neither view alone offers an airtight normative explanation of how the Court should
operate in Rules cases—the Court in effect subscribes to both
visions without attempting to reconcile them. When it wants to
declaim interpretive power, the Court interprets the Rules narrowly using traditional statutory interpretation tools, and
urges dissatisfied parties to seek recourse through rulemaking.
But when it is frustrated with the rulemaking process or otherwise wants to recalibrate litigation norms, the Court toggles
seamlessly into the other paradigm—the paradigm of broad,
almost unbounded, common-law power. There is an inborn
tension in the Court’s de jure and de facto relationship to the
Rules. Consciously or not, the Court exploits the vast interpretive space opened up by that tension.
B. Linguistic
The second fault line creating pressure on the interpretation of the Federal Rules is the Rules themselves. Since their
origin in 1938, the Rules have remained preternaturally resilient against a background of enormous upheaval in the law,
including the explosion of federal civil rights statutes and state
tort law in the 1960s that together spurred wild innovation in
complex litigation, the flood of asbestos litigation in the 1980s
and 1990s, and the ongoing technological transformation of
discovery and other litigation practices. They are a combination of high culture and low culture, of law and equity. Some
Rules, like Rule 23 and Rule 26, reshape the range of possibilities that lawyers and courts can imagine. Others, like Rule 6,
166
See Merrill, supra note 131, at 20 (noting the Framers’ intent that “the
principal barrier” to judicial overreaching be “self-restraint”).
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serve more clerical functions.167 Through it all, the Rules have
gone far toward being all things to all litigants over a period of
decades, often without any significant interpretive guidance
from the Supreme Court at all.168
But the very malleability of the Rules undermines any effort to put forth a unitary theory of interpretation. The abstract, Panglossian aspirations of Rule 1—arguably the most
important (though underappreciated) canon of Rules interpretation—frustrate any simplistic methodology for construing the
Rules. Compounding Rule 1’s ambiguity, many of the Rules
intentionally rely upon nonliteral—almost poetic—language to
give life to the need for judicial discretion in Rules interpretation, especially in those Rules with equitable roots. These deliberate linguistic ambiguities in the Rules, intended to
increase their adaptability to ever-changing conditions, simultaneously increase the range of possible and appropriate interpretive methodologies. The Rules are limber; that very
limberness fuels the Court’s interpretive independence.
1. The Mixed Signals of Rule 1
Rule 1, which instructs that the Rules “shall be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding,”169 has been described as the “master Rule.”170 According to Professor Robert
Bone, Rule 1 “affects how all the other Rules are interpreted
and applied.”171 A major treatise on civil procedure concurs,
referring to Rule 1 as “the most important rule of all.”172 Recently Harold Koh used Rule 1’s language as a framing lens
through which to ask big questions about whether the federal
courts are meeting its vision of a fair and reasonable litigation
system.173 With its abstract language and focus on justice,
Rule 1 admirably serves this rhetorical purpose.
167

FED. R. CIV. P. 6.
For example, the Court has never given significant consideration to the
following Rules: 2, 4.1, 5, 5.1, 5.2, 7.1, 7, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.2, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31,
32, 36, 40, 44, 44.1, 47, 62, 62.1, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84,
85, and 86.
169
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
170
Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 288 (2010).
171
Id.
172
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRACTICE & PROC. § 1101,
at 60 (3d ed. 2002).
173
See Harold Hongju Koh, The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination
of Every Action?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1525 (2014).
168
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When it comes to its impact on interpretation of the Rules,
however, Rule 1 sends murky, distinctly mixed, signals—if indeed it sends any signals at all.174 Rule 1 was conceived of by
its drafters as a statement of interpretive methodology, the goal
of which was to prevent technicality and formalism from
preventing disputes from being resolved on their merits.175 In
this sense, Rule 1 functions as the Rules equivalent of an
agency’s regulatory preamble—a statement of basis and purpose.176 However, the interpretive power of Rule 1 has either
disappeared from consideration by courts as an interpretive
tool, or else—over the past few decades—it has been recast to
justify restrictive, rather than flexible, Rules interpretations in
the name of cost-savings and systemic efficiency.177 What remains, then, is a malleable set of principles that can support a
Court’s statutory interpretation of a Rule, but that simultaneously provides textual support within the Rules themselves for
the Court’s managerial Rules interpretations. In other words,
to the extent that Rule 1’s interpretive guidance is considered a
source of interpretive influence at all, it can help to justify both
of the Roberts Court’s reigning, and seemingly contradictory,
interpretive paradigms.
To be influential, however, a Rule must be recognized, and
Rule 1’s defining trait might be anonymity, at least in any sense
beyond its somewhat common use as a rhetorical maxim.178
To take one obvious example, most major civil procedure texts
and treatises either omit Rule 1 entirely, refer to only the first
174
Bone, supra note 170, at 288 (describing Rule 1 as seeming “at best hopelessly vague and at worst downright misleading”).
175
See id. at 293 (“An optimal system was constructed around the core elements of adversarial process freed from code and common law technicalities and
designed to . . . manage litigation toward just decisions on the merits.”). The
language of Rule 1 seems first to have appeared in a 1917 bill reported by Senator
Sutherland, which charged the Court, when making Rules, to have “regard to the
simplification of the system of pleading, practice, and procedure in said courts, so
as to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits.” Stephen
B.Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1067 (1982)
(quoting S. 4551, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916), reprinted in S REP. NO. 892, 64th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1917)).
176
See Stack, supra note 6, at 360–61 (noting that, unlike statutes, regulations must contain a statement of purpose, and arguing that this requirement
supports a purposive form of regulatory interpretation).
177
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (justifying
heightened pleading standards as necessary “to avoid the potentially enormous
expense of discovery in cases”); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text
(same rationale applies in Iqbal, in order to relieve government officials of burdens
of litigation).
178
See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1654 (2013) (quoting Rule 1’s language as a rhetorical
device rather than an interpretive tool).
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sentence of the Rule—which is unrelated to interpretation179—
or, at most, contain an oblique embedded reference to Rule 1’s
purposive language in the context of analyzing a different
Rule.180 This lack of attention to Rule 1 in textbooks indicates
that law students (i.e., future lawyers and judges) likely do not
connect Rule 1’s purposive statement to a methodology of
Rules interpretation. In parallel with—or as an outgrowth of—
this lack of pedagogical attention, Rule 1 does not appear to be
influential among the few scholars who have sought to develop
interpretive methodologies for the Rules.181 In general, Rule 1
has drawn minimal scholarly attention.182
Rule 1’s lack of influence on Rule interpretation may in
part reflect the modern frustration with the concept of purpose
as an interpretive force in the interpretation of statutes. With
various forms of textualism currently ascendant in the Supreme Court, Hart and Sacks’s purposivism has waned in theoretical influence, given the view of many that it is incompatible
with the dominant view that the Court acts as Congress’ “faithful agent” when it interprets statutes.183 The faithful agent
metaphor is less appropriate in the context of the Rules—where
the Court and Congress share power—but the conflation of
Rules with statutes carries the faithful agent baggage into the
realm of the Rules. Perhaps reflecting this, Catherine Struve’s
179
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2010) (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil
actions and proceedings.”).
180
See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., COLIN C. TAIT, WILLIAM A. FLETCHER &
STEPHEN MCG. BUNDY, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 504, 696 (10th ed. 2010) (one
citation to the first sentence, one embedded citation in the context of discussing
Rule 15); ROBERT H. KLONOFF ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION (4th ed. 2012) (no citation); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 306, 614
(8th ed. 2012) (citing Rule 1 only for the proposition that the Rules join law and
equity); RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (3d ed. 2012) (one reference to Rule
1).
181
See Marcus, supra note 5 (no reference to Rule 1); Moore, supra note 5 at
1096 (arguing without analysis that Rule 1 should inform courts’ Rules interpretations). But see Bauer, supra note 5 (only a passing reference to Rule 1).
182
Only a smattering of scholarly articles squarely address Rule 1, and even
these are generally aimed at using the Rule to promote cost savings, rather than
as a canon of interpretation. See generally Bone, supra note 170, at 287–88
(describing the history and possible reforms to Rule 1); Elizabeth J. Cabraser &
Katherine Lehe, Uncovering Discovery, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 2 (2011) (arguing for
Rule 1 as a tool to limit discovery abuses); Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M.
Singer, Managing Toward the Goals of Rule 1, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 8–13 (2010)
(arguing for changes to pretrial schedules and discovery limits to help judicial
case management achieve efficiency goals of Rule 1).
183
See Stack, supra note 6, at 421 (explaining that, “[a]t least as a theory of
judicial statutory interpretation, purposivism has been in retreat in the face of
textualist critiques”); Manning, supra note 66, at 18 (noting the “root of the textualist position is . . . [the] faithful agent theory”).
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article on Rules interpretation dismisses Rule 1 in a footnote as
too vague to be of value.184
Courts, too, have given relatively little attention to Rule 1.
In the first decades after its promulgation, courts sometimes
relied on the Rule to mitigate the harsh effects of technical
defects or “to excuse strict compliance with the Federal Rules
when there was no significant prejudice to any party’s substantive right.”185 But that use of Rule 1 lost, rather than gained,
momentum over time. As a Rules-based canon of interpretation, Rule 1 fell later almost into desuetude. While district
courts appear to be citing Rule 1 in increasing numbers of
late,186 the Supreme Court has given the Rule only a desultory
glance: although occasionally the Court refers to Rule 1 as a
command to interpret the Rules in order to achieve procedural
due process, in practice the Court’s rare references to Rule 1
tend to be rhetorical rather than constructive.187
Finally, to the extent that Rule 1 is used by courts—including the Supreme Court—as an interpretive tool, its message is
distinctly mixed. In fact, due to significant cultural and semantic drift over the past fifty years, the modern incarnation of
Rule 1 in key respects means almost the opposite of its originally intended meaning. The drafters intended for Rule 1 to
embody the spirit of nontechnicality and flexibility of procedural due process, in reaction against the perceived inefficiency
and injustice of the earlier, hypertechnical requirements such
as code pleading.188 The drafters’ goal was to move disputes
toward resolution at trial.189 Seventy-five years later, however,
in light of a drastically-changed litigation landscape, the drafters’ focus on individual litigants and on resolving disputes on
184
See Struve, supra note 5, at n.177 (expressing skepticism that Rule 1
would solve any problems).
185
Bone, supra note 170, at 293–94 (also noting that courts so interpreting
Rule 1 tended not to focus on particular language in the Rule, but rather to treat it
as a gestalt message in favor of liberal procedure).
186
See Cabraser & Lehe, supra note 182, at 4 (asserting, based on an empirical analysis of Rule 1 citations, that the Rule “has finally been discovered as a
working component of the Federal Rules”).
187
See, e.g., Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 27 (1986) (rejecting petitioner’s claims under Rule 15 “[d]espite [Rule 1’s] . . . loftily stated purposes”).
188
See Bone, supra note 170, at 293 (stating that Rule drafters believed “[a]n
optimal system was constructed around the core elements of adversarial process
freed from code and common law technicalities and designed to ferret out facts
and evidence and manage litigation toward just decisions on the merits”).
189
See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1713, 1715 (2012) (explaining that the Rules were originally “designed to achieve
a fundamental goal: to facilitate the resolution of cases on their merits”).

R
R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN103.txt

2015]

unknown

PRAGMATISM RULES

Seq: 39

28-OCT-15

12:22

161

the merits—ideally at trial—now seems almost quaint.190 In
federal courts trial has become a vanishing (although increasingly expensive) art—more of a cultural trope than a practical
reality; and the rise of the managerial judging paradigm together with the new preeminence of settlement and arbitration
have further eroded the adversarial, trial-driven system.191
As Maria Glover has emphasized, the Federal Rules—still
infused with a now-hypothetical goal of resolving disputes on
their merits—are not uniformly effective in the new world of
settlement and aggregation.192 At a minimum, courts and litigants have been forced to adapt their use of the Rules, using
old weapons to fight new battles.193 This is not the equivalent
of using cavalry against tanks. Winter is not coming. Nevertheless, because the fit is no longer perfect, the Rules have
evolved to meet changing litigation norms.
Rule 1 is no exception. Rule 1’s text as well as its interpretive force evolved in tandem with this cultural shift. Textually,
in 1993, the Rule was amended to include the words “and
administered” after “construed,” to “highlight the importance of
reducing cost and delay and to emphasize the value of active
case management.”194 In terms of interpretation, language
that originally conveyed a sense of fairness to individual litigants now instead conveys the concepts of Pareto-optimality
and systemic efficiency that have permeated modern legal culture.195 In other words, Rule 1 now may embody values of
efficiency rather than justice. And where Rule 1 formerly inspired interpretive liberality, some modern courts now cite the
same text as support for a strict construction of the rules; the
need to comply rigidly with Rule requirements is seen as essen190
See id. at 1717 (examining “the maladaptiveness of the Federal Rules to a
world of settlement”).
191
See id. at 1720 (describing federal civil trials as a “rarity”); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1955 (2009) (stating that, in 2005, approximately 1.3% of federal civil cases reached trial); see also
Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 482 (2012) (mandating that courts
promulgate an expense and delay reduction plan).
192
See Glover, supra note 189, at 1717 (arguing that “pretrial procedural
mechanisms, designed largely as ‘way-stations’ on the road to trial, fail to promote
and at times hinder meaningful merits-based settlement terms”).
193
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 34–36 (2010) (describing
how Twombly has ushered in “a new model of civil procedure”).
194
Bone, supra note 170, at 298 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1 Advisory Committee
Notes to 1993 amendment).
195
See Bone, supra note 170, at 297 (noting that “there has been a noticeable
shift over the past thirty years toward use of Rule 1 to support stricter interpretations of the Federal Rules”).
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tial to making dispute resolution “speedy,” and “inexpensive,”
criteria that now seem synonymous with “just.”196
This shift is reflected in some of the justices’ rare references to Rule 1. For example, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Company captures the semantic
recalibration:
The principle that “mere technicalities” should not stand in
the way of deciding a case on the merits is more a prescription for ignoring the Federal Rules than a useful guide to
their construction and application. By definition all rules of
procedure are technicalities; sanction for failure to comply
with them always prevents the court from deciding where
justice lies in the particular case, on the theory that securing
a fair and orderly process enables more justice to be done in
the totality of cases.197

To Justice Scalia, Rule 1 essentially provides no interpretive
insight at all, except as a general exhortation to keep the trains
running on time.198
Rule 1 continues to evolve today. In light of the provision’s
weakness and ambiguity, Professor Bone has suggested rewriting the text of the Rule to reemphasize fairness to the parties
rather than more abstract questions of “system-wide effects.”199 But the Advisory Committee seems to have gone in a
different direction, based on amendments to Rule 1 that are
currently awaiting comment from the Supreme Court. Rather
than emphasizing the interpretive force of the Rule, the proposed modification instead expands on the concepts of administration and cost-minimization by inserting additional
196
See Cabraser & Lehe, supra note 182, at 5–14 (describing lower courts’ use
of Rule 1 to contain ballooning discovery costs).
197
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (invoking Rule 1
in support of strict compliance with Rule 26 to prevent “mushrooming litigation
costs”).
198
See Torres, 487 U.S. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It seems to me . . . that
we should seek to interpret the rules neither liberally nor stingily, but only, as
best we can, according to their apparent intent. Where that intent is to provide
leeway, a permissive construction is the right one; where it is to be strict, a
permissive construction is wrong. Thus, the very first of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe that they are to be ‘liberally construed,’ but rather that
they are to be ‘construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
199
Bone, supra note 170, at 300 (proposing a revised Rule that reads: “[The
Rules] shall be construed and administered to distribute the risk of outcome error
fairly and efficiently with due regard for party participation appropriate to the
case, due process and other constitutional constraints, and practical limitations
on a judge’s ability to predict consequences accurately and assess system-wide
effects”).
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language making it explicit that the parties should use the
Rules to advance litigation efficiencies. The proposed Rule 1
states that the Rules “should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of disputes.200 These
modifications are unquestionably aimed at lowering litigation
costs, and they also seem potentially designed to level the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants (by, for example,
preventing wealthy corporate defendants from deliberately
draining plaintiffs’ resources through unending discovery and
other similar tactics).201 Simultaneously, however, the proposed revisions further minimize the interpretive force of Rule
1, further constraining it to a cost-savings role that is either
distant from interpretive purpose or that may potentially serve
as a tool for stricter, more rigid Rules interpretations in the
name of efficiency.
The combined effect of the weak influence of Rule 1 as an
interpretive guide to courts, its shift in meaning toward costsavings and systemic efficiency over the last several decades,
and the revisions aimed at deepening that efficiency focus is to
reduce the purposive force of Rule 1. Nevertheless, because of
its indeterminacy, particularly in the context of its recently
increased association with efficiency, Rule 1 provides an internal, text-based anchor for the Roberts Court’s managerial
Rules interpretation. If the Court wishes to focus on systemic
efficiency, Rule 1’s “speedy and efficient” language provides
support for that. If, instead, it chooses to interpret the Rules in
an atextualist manner, the Rule might also provide support for
that: after all, one person’s justice is another’s litigation loss.
2. The Poetry of Equity
Rule 1 is only one of the mysterious interpretive byways of
the Federal Rules. There is a poetry—an irreducible opacity—
to many of the Rules, permeated as they are with the indeterminate, open-ended philosophy of equity.202 Rules such as
200
Proposed Amendment to FED. R. CIV P. 1, as stated in a letter to Judge
Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure from
Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (June 14, 2014) (underlined text in original to show revised text).
201
See Cabraser & Lehe, supra note 182, at 15 (documenting “the strategy of
attrition via discovery abuse” in tobacco litigation and more generally). Cabraser,
a member of the Advisory Committee, charges litigants and courts “to enforce, in
particular, Rule 1 as our daily practice.” Id. at 42.
202
See Subrin, supra note 86, at 922 (“The underlying philosophy of, and
procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules were almost universally drawn
from equity rather than common law.”).
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those governing joinder and class actions, or even the impenetrable simplicity of Rule 12(b)(6)203 or Rule 60(b)(5),204 use
every-day language to press the boundaries of legal interpretation, just as poetry simultaneously expands and undermines
our unexamined beliefs about prose. Frequently the question
at the heart of these poetic Rules is the same as the unanswerable, eternally attractive question at the heart of another legal
poem, Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf.205 Like the court
in Palsgraf, the Rules governing joinder or class certification
must answer questions of degree and relativity: how unrelated
is too unrelated? How unwieldy is too unwieldy? How much—
of whatever is at stake—is too much?
In Palsgraf, Cardozo answered with his own theory of relativity, in the form of a two-page poem. Stripping away factual
clutter, Cardozo placed the plaintiff (whom he stripped of all
characteristics beyond gender) on what seems like a barren,
postmodern way-station rather than a bustling train platform.
In a series of short, almost disconnected, sentences, Cardozo
used language to doom the plaintiff’s claim, foreshadowing a
holding of disconnection and distance.206 In dissent, Judge
Andrews interpreted the same case record but found connection instead of detachment, proximity instead of isolation.207
And therein lies the most famous koan of the common law.208
203
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (stating that “a party may assert the following defense[ ] by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted”).
204
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a
party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [if] . . .
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable”).
205
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
206
Id. at 99 (“Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant’s railroad after
buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the station, bound for
another place. Two men ran forward to catch it.”).
207
See id. at 101–05 (“There was no remoteness in time, little in space. And
surely, given such an explosion as here, it needed no great foresight to predict
that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater
distance from its scene than was the plaintiff.”).
208
Koan is a Japanese word (originally derived from the Chinese kung-an)
meaning “a paradox to be meditated upon that is used to train Zen Buddhist
monks to abandon ultimate dependence on reason and to force them into gaining
sudden intuitive enlightenment.” Koan, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2004). The poetic equivalent in constitutional jurisprudence is the
command in Brown v. Board of Education II ordering schools to desegregate with
“all deliberate speed.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 253–54 (1986)
(1962) (noting that the phrase “resembles poetry and resembles equity techniques
of discretionary accommodation between principle and expediency”).
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Meanwhile, in the realm of procedure, analogs include such
recurring phrases such as “transaction or occurrence,” “common question of law or fact,” and “genuine material fact,” all of
which use simple yet undefinable language to pose the questions of relation, connection, and legal obligation.209 Although
these equitable Rules might not invite simple—or even consistent210—answers, the questions are part of what unite our profession. These are the words to the chorus of the song of
procedure, and we can sing along with them even without quite
knowing what we are saying.
When the Rules’ drafters tied the poetry of equity practice
to the prose of the law, they invited the case-specific, innately
discretionary spirit of equity into the interpretation of many of
the Rules.211 After all, historically the powers of equity “were
as vast, and its processes and procedure as elastic, as all the
changing emergencies of increasingly complex relations could
demand.”212 The ancient common-law theory of “the equity of
the statute” is another way to justify this flexible, purposedriven form of interpretation. That theory posits that inherent
judicial power—the power “to say what the law is”—historically
encompassed an equitable power to refashion statutes to accomplish their purpose.213 John Manning has argued that
such purposivism is incompatible with the theory that the
Court acts as Congress’s “faithful agent” when it interprets
statutes.214 Whatever the merits of that argument, once the
Rules come out from the shadow of statutes, the faithful agent
metaphor loses its force. Unconstrained by that “faithful
agent” mentality, and in view of Rule 1, the “equity of the stat209
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder for claims “arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” where the
parties allege “any question of law or fact common to” all plaintiffs or all defendants); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (to qualify as a class, there must be “questions of law or
fact common to the class”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (summary judgment appropriate if
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”).
210
See Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759 (2012)
(arguing that consistency in interpretation across the joinder rules does disservice
to the varying purposes of each of those Rules).
211
See id. at 773 (noting that joinder Rules “are meant to be highly flexible and
context specific, yet simultaneously demand an elusive base line of commonality”); Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1970 (2007) (arguing “the Federal Rules license discretion
. . . by incorporating vague language inviting case-specific discretion”).
212
Main, supra note 159, at 434.
213
Manning, supra note 66, at 7.
214
Id. at 10 (noting that proponents of “equity of the statute” reject the “faithful agent” theory as “an ahistorical and unjustifiable conception of the judicial
power”).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN103.txt

166

unknown

Seq: 44

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

28-OCT-15

12:22

[Vol. 101:123

ute” may more accurately be described as “the equity of the
Rule.”
At least in theory, however, such equitable power—
whatever its source—is primarily intended to belong to the trial
judge, who by virtue of her close relationship to the case is in a
better position than appellate courts to grasp the facts and the
relationship between parties.215 Some scholars have questioned whether district court judges have the significant institutional competence that such discretion presumes.216
Whatever the limits of that competence, the Supreme Court
suffers the same limitations to a greater degree, due to their
detached consideration of a cold record. Inevitably, however,
the same capacious language that gives district courts license
to creatively manage cases also gives the Court freedom to write
opinions that hover above—rather than being constrained by—
the Rules’ text. But there are inevitable differences in the way
these different courts will use that freedom. In contrast to trial
court judges, whose primary consideration is the competing
positions of the parties to a dispute, the Court is in a much
broader dialogue with a range of competing stakeholders, including rulemakers, Congress, perhaps the United States as
amicus, the plaintiffs’ and defense bars—and only then, almost
as an afterthought, the parties.
Notably, there is no connection between the poetic language of a Rule and the rhetorical or aesthetic power of the
Court’s decisions interpreting that Rule. To the contrary, the
poetry of equity has led to several distinctly unpoetic decisions
by the Roberts Court. The quirky simplicity of Rule 8 is obliterated by the unwieldy, turgid opinions in Twombly and Iqbal.217
Indeed, it is only the Court’s recent retreat to statutory interpretation of Rule 8 in its City of Shelby per curiam written by
Justice Ginsburg that evokes the compact meaningfulness of
poetic language.218 Justice Ginsburg may accurately be described as the poetic Justice. Her trademark disciplined,
preternaturally precise language has a slightly unconventional
meter for prose; her judicial voice simultaneously defines the
215
See Bone, supra note 211, at 1967–69 (explaining that “critical normative
judgments are left for the trial judge to make in individual cases”).
216
See id. at 1986–2001 (arguing that bounded rationality, insufficient access
to information, and the strategic role of the modern judge together limit the
efficacy of judicial discretion in Rule implementation).
217
See Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 645–46 (2011)
(summarizing commentators’ views of Twombly and Iqbal as “inscrutable” and
“cryptic”).
218
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014).
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law and asks serious readers of her opinions to self-consciously celebrate the written word.219
Also notable, the Roberts Court has not tempered the interpretive freedom the Rules’ abstract language affords with
respect for the abuse-of-discretion standard of review or the
canon of judicial minimalism.220 The Roberts Court has sidestepped those obstacles with the nimbleness of a matador. For
example, in Wal-Mart—a case whose very raison d’etre is the
idea that courts cannot question discretionary decisions221—
the majority opinion does not even mention the abuse-of-discretion standard of review; nor does it justify its decision to
lead with its 23(a)(2) commonality analysis, the entirety of
which was arguably unnecessary for the Court to decide given
the unanimous rejection of class certification under (b)(2).222
Similarly, in Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, the Court
breezily evades the standard of review of a Rule 19 “indispensable party” analysis, which should almost certainly have been
abuse of discretion: “Whatever the appropriate standard of review,” it holds, “a point we need not decide, the judgment could
not stand.”223 These opinions make clear that, at least for the
Roberts Court, once it has granted review of a procedural case,
219
Justice Ginsburg has often stated her dream of being an artist—an opera
diva, however, rather than a poet. See, e.g., Paige Lavender, Ruth Bader Ginsburg:
“In My Dreams, I Can Be a Great Diva,” HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013, 10:57
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/31/ruth-bader-ginsburgdiva_n_3682452.html [http://perma.cc/M88S-7G5S].
220
See infra Part III for discussion of how renewed respect for these traditions
is an essential aspect of a functional interpretive methodology for the Federal
Rules.
221
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (“The
whole point of permitting discretionary decisionmaking is to avoid evaluating
employees under a common standard.”).
222
See generally Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (failing to provide in the
majority opinion either an abuse of discretion standard of review and a justification of its 23(a)(2) commonality analysis). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, in contrast,
does cite the standard of review, and concludes that no such abuse of discretion
occurred. See id. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (“Absent an error of
law or an abuse of discretion, an appellate tribunal has no warrant to upset the
District Court’s finding of commonality.”); id. at 2564 (characterizing the district
court’s commonality analysis as “hardly infirm”).
223
553 U.S. 851, 864 (2008) (emphasis added). In Horne v. Flores, to take
another example, the Court subtly rephrases the standard of review, stating that
once a party has met its burden of establishing changed circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(5), a court abuses its discretion if it fails to provide
such 60(b)(5) relief. 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009). But the courts below in Horne had
specifically not found that changed circumstances warranted relief. Id. at
443–44. It is the Court that reinterprets the facts to find that the state has met its
burden, after which a finding of abuse of discretion was inevitable. Id. at 450–51.
See infra Part III for a discussion of the Court’s blurring in Horne of the distinction
between fact and law.
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it will put its own—de novo—imprimatur upon it, the stamp of
the managerial court.
In light of this blank-slate approach, the Court’s managerial interpretations of the Rules embody the freedom and spirit
of discretion—the “equity of the Rule.” And to some degree,
that spirit is a deliberate part of the design of the Rules: Put
simply, the drafters “recognized that the system they were creating lacked restraint.”224 The question is whether that flexibility was intended to apply equally to lower court and
Supreme Court interpretations. As of now, the Roberts Court’s
position seems to be that it does. Just as trial courts are intended to do, the Court balances the factual and procedural
factors it perceives as relevant and it considers the likely preferences of a variety of different, and perhaps conflicting, stakeholders. But when a district court does this, it typically
addresses a single case or at most a set of cases. In contrast,
when the Supreme Court employs similar interpretive liberality, it sets (and potentially disrupts) nationwide legal norms.
C. Epistemological
The final fault line in Rules interpretation is abstract, yet
familiar: the recurring and unresolvable tensions between substance and procedure, between the goal of the Rules to be
trans-substantive and the inherent need to interpret those
Rules in the context of highly variable individual cases.225
1. Procedure v. Substance
The first of these tensions—the interrelationship between
substance and procedure—may be described in complex legal
terms,226 or it may be described to a ten-year-old sports fan by
reference to one of any number of football- or baseball-related
controversies where a change in rules is literally game chang224

See Subrin, supra note 86, at 975.
See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading
of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975).
226
See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure
Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 106 (2011) (“blurring of the substanceprocedure dichotomy [is] inappropriate” and “based on a misguided aspiration to
accommodate state substantive policies at the expense of federal procedure”);
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 784 (2006) (arguing that constitutional criminal procedural protections have
had unintended negative substantive consequences); Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure,
Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 881 (2011) (“rules of procedure inevitably change the value of substantive entitlements and claims”).
225
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ing.227 For a variety of reasons, the Rules’ drafters subscribed
to a clear, almost scientific delineation between the two categories,228 a belief embodied in the Enabling Act’s prohibition
against abridging, enlarging or modifying “any substantive
right.”229 The Court’s early Rules decisions confirmed this
somewhat artificial dichotomy.230 However, in part under
pressure from Erie’s requirement that federal courts apply
state substantive law in diversity cases,231 and in part from a
recognition that procedure and substance are never entirely
distinguishable,232 the division between procedure and substance has substantially eroded. This blurring has led to metaphysical hand-wringing among scholars.233 While some have
argued that the procedure-substance divide is a harmful fiction, others maintain that the distinction is—if not perfect—at
least serviceable: it provides doctrinal and analytic clarity, and
it promotes the predictable functioning of the litigation
system.234
227
See generally Dustin E. Buehler & Steve P. Calandrillo, Baseball’s Moral
Hazard: Law, Economics, and the Designated Hitter Rule, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2083
(2010) (analyzing the effects on game strategy of the designated-hitter rule in
baseball, according to which American League teams, unlike their National
League counterparts, can designate a player to hit in place of the pitcher); see also
Warren Sharp, Dropped Balls: The Patriots Became Nearly Fumble-Proof After a
2006 Rule Change Backed By Tom Brady, SLATE (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:42 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2015/01/stats_show_the
_new_england_patriots_became_nearly_fumble_proof_after_a_2006.html [http://
perma.cc/D53X-U2UA] (not that we Seattleites are bitter).
228
See Subrin, supra note 86, at 929–31 (arguing that the emergence of legal
treatises and standardized law school curricula, the integration of equity and law,
and the separation of powers problems associated with increased legislative activity were factors that led the Rules’ drafters to promote the concept of a unified,
segregated procedural code).
229
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
230
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941) (upholding validity of
Rule 35’s medical examination requirement against an Enabling Act challenge
and dismissing the idea that “in regulating procedure this court should not deal
with important and substantial rights”); see also Hendricks, supra note 226, at
114 (noting that “Hanna implicitly recognized that the Federal Rules are federal
laws like any other”).
231
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
232
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“[the Rules] regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either”).
233
See Redish & Amuluru, supra note 105, at 1314, 1320 (stating it as “beyond controversy today that many Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicate
substantial policy issues, often going to the core of modern political and ideological debates” and arguing that substance-procedure conflation casts constitutional doubt on the Enabling Act).
234
See Hendricks, supra note 226, at 107–08 (defending a “black-white approach” to the substance-procedure conundrum); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad
for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a
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The Roberts Court’s two interpretive paradigms for interpreting the Rules correspond neatly to the two sides of this
debate. The belief in a hermetically-sealed category of procedure illuminates many of the Roberts Court’s statutory Rules
decisions. In cases like Krupski and Unitherm, for example, the
Court approaches the Rules as forms of positive law with firmly
identifiable meaning.235 The Court’s managerial interpretation
cases, by contrast, consistently challenge the premise of the
substance-procedure divide.
Perhaps the clearest example of this philosophical dichotomy is the Roberts Court’s recent Erie case, Shady Grove.236
The resolution of Erie cases inevitably hits on a pressure point
between (state) substantive law and (federal) procedural law.237
Led by Justice Ginsburg, in a somewhat uncharacteristic departure from her predisposition toward statutory mode in
Rules cases, some members of the Court have sought to develop an Erie framework that accommodates state law as much
as possible within the confines of federal procedure.238 Thus,
in Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg argued on behalf of four
Justices that Rule 23’s framework for class certification should
not be construed as displacing a New York statute that would,
if applicable, have prevented the plaintiff’s underlying claims
from being brought as a class action.239 In so arguing, Justice
Ginsburg did not focus on the text of Rule 23 or of the state law
provision at issue. Instead she sought to fulfill what she believed to be the purpose of the state law by minimizing Rule
23’s ambit.240 Justice Ginsburg’s pragmatic, policy-driven inHalfway Decent Job in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963
(1998).
235
See, e.g., Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394,
405–06 (2006) (requiring Court to look at plain text of Rule 50 to dictate outcome
of case).
236
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393
(2010).
237
Erie requires that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply federal procedural law but state substantive law (rather than federal common law).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
238
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393 (2010); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415 (1996).
239
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The absence of
an inevitable collision between Rule 23 and [the New York law] becomes evident
once it is comprehended that a federal court sitting in diversity can accord due
respect to both state and federal prescriptions.”).
240
Id. at 402 (Scalia, J.) (noting that “[t]he dissent all but admits that the
literal terms of [the New York law] address the same subject as Rule 23 . . . but
insists the provision’s purpose is to restrict only remedies” (emphasis in original)).
In a lone, lengthy, and highly irritating concurrence, Justice Stevens appeared to

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN103.txt

2015]

unknown

PRAGMATISM RULES

Seq: 49

28-OCT-15

12:22

171

terpretation of Rule 23 in her Shady Grove dissent is quintessentially managerial. As one scholar put it, “the Court has
thus embarked on a new phase of Erie doctrine, a phrase that
replaces ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with ‘Let’s see what we can work out.’”241
Meanwhile, in a plurality opinion representing the views of
another four Justices, Justice Scalia—despite often being on
the vanguard of managerial interpretations of the Rules—retreated to the black-white version of the substance-procedure
divide. Echoing the Sibbach shibboleth and avoiding citation to
the “accommodation” strain of Erie precedents, he found that
Rule 23 “really regulates procedure,”242 and therefore “provides
a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action question.”243 Justice Scalia’s textual interpretation of Rule 23—
which one scholar described as “especially deferential, even
simplistic”244—places his opinion squarely in the statutory interpretation camp.245
2. Trans-substantivity v. Specificity
Related to the tension between procedure and substance,
the Roberts Court’s Rules interpretations also reflect a tug-ofwar between the Platonic ideal of the Rules as trans-substantive246 formulations impervious to the vagaries of substantive
law, and the reality that the Rules—like the Wonder Twins—
must take on different forms to actuate their powers appropriately to the need of the moment.247
Robert Cover is credited with putting a name to procedural
trans-substantivity.248 As Cover observed, we are “transfixed”
concur with the reasoning of Justice Ginsburg, but in applying that reasoning he
agreed with the conclusion reached by Justice Scalia’s plurality. Id. at 416–24
(Stevens, J., concurring).
241
Hendricks, supra note 226, at 103.
242
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
14 (1941)).
243
Id. at 399.
244
Hendricks, supra note 226, at 123.
245
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398–99 (resting interpretation on Rule 23’s language stating that “[a] class action may be maintained” if the Rule’s criteria are
met).
246
See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 372 (2010) (explaining that federal
procedural rules are trans-substantive because they “apply equally to all areas of
substantive legal doctrine” and arguing that this feature “reduces complexity” and
engenders simplicity).
247
Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court,
Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 698 (1988) (describing the Justices as having “visions of uniformity dancing in their heads”).
248
See Cover, supra note 225, at 718; see also Marcus, supra note 246, at 372
(acknowledging Cover’s contribution in this regard).
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with trans-substantivity.249 Notwithstanding the importance
of trans-substantive values in procedural law, Cover observed,
“there are also demands of particular substantive objectives
which cannot be served except through the purposeful shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of process to a case or to an area
of law.”250 Since their promulgation, the overwhelming tenor of
the Federal Rules has been trans-substantive;251 in contrast,
Congress’s procedural enactments have frequently addressed
targeted subject areas.252
When it comes to interpreting the Rules, the Roberts
Court’s decisions fluctuate significantly in their fidelity to a
trans-substantive ideal. Just as the Roberts Court’s divergent
interpretive paradigms approach the substance-procedure conundrum from very different angles, the two modes of interpretation are imbued with contradictory views about the value of
trans-substantivity. The Court’s statutory interpretations of
the Rules tend to adhere to the norm of trans-substantivity—or
at least be very explicit about any departure from that norm—
while its managerial decisions often seem to be deliberately
unclear about whether they are limited to particular subject
areas or have trans-substantive objectives.
The common-law methodology that seems to undergird the
Court’s managerial interpretations exacerbates this substancespecific tendency. Common-law decisions are responsive to
evolving legal and social conditions: “As new cases arise within
a given class, for example, vehicular accidents or communications among people forming contractual arrangements, they
are initially decided on their facts, a case at a time.”253 General
rules emerge after a period of maturation. Something very like
this common-law process was at work in the Court’s pleading
decisions. As one commentator noted, it was initially unclear
whether Twombly’s telecommunications-specific analysis was
intended to apply outside that context, but the Court’s decision
249

Cover, supra note 225, at 718.
Id.
251
See Marcus, supra note 246, at 376 (stating that “[t]he vast majority of the
Federal Rules are trans-substantive”).
252
See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453,
1711–15 (2012) (specifying removal procedures for class actions); Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994 ed. & Supp. II); Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(3)(D) (2012) (statutorily imposing stay of discovery in securities litigation
pending ruling on a motion to dismiss).
253
See FREDERIC R. KELLOGG, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., LEGAL THEORY, AND
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 28 (2007).
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in Iqbal two years later served as a “trans[-]substantive exclamation point.”254
The Court’s class action cases are also instructive. In WalMart, the majority uses its discussion of Rule 23(a)(2) to make
strong—very detailed—pronouncements about the difficulty of
proving Title VII discrimination in any suit against an employer
when the employer’s policies prioritize discretionary decision
making against a stated background policy of nondiscrimination.255 That presumption permeates the Court’s commonality
discussion, particularly its demand that the plaintiff class
show “significant proof” of discriminatory policies or practices
at the certification stage.256 The result of this tight integration
of procedure and substance is a high degree of analytic imprecision concerning the showing necessary for commonality
outside of Wal-Mart’s particular Title VII context.
In contrast, the Rule 23(b)(2) analysis in Wal-Mart draws a
clear line against using the (b)(2) class mechanism to seek
monetary remedy—regardless of the substantive law under
which a class might seek that remedy.257 In that same vein,
despite explicitly acknowledging that the case “involves the interaction between federal securities-fraud laws and Rule 23’s
requirements for class certification,”258 the majority opinion in
Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
preserves Rule 23’s trans-substantivity. Amgen’s holding
“rest[s] . . . entirely on the text of Rule 23(b)(3),”259 and only
refers to the specific substantive question—whether the plaintiff must prove materiality at the certification stage—insofar as
is necessary to dispel “free-ranging merits inquiries.”260 The
Court declines to massage Rule 23 to achieve securities-litigation-specific aims, finding that Congress has employed other
tools, including heightened pleading standards, to deal with
settlement pressures in that area.261
254

See Hoffman, supra note 125, at 1485.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011) (stating
without evidence that “left to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and
promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all”).
256
Id. at 2553.
257
Id. at 2557.
258
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013).
259
Id. at 1196.
260
Id. at 1194–95.
261
Id. at 1200; see also id. at 1201 (“Because congress has homed in on the
precise policy concerns raised in Amgen’s brief, ‘we do not think it appropriate for
the judiciary to make its own further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 23 to
255
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***
The “trend of modern procedural law has been away from
rules that make policy choices towards those that confer on
trial courts a substantial amount of normative discretion.”262
When it comes to judicial interpretation of the Rules, that shift
in emphasis has trickled up: the Supreme Court has—and exercises—tremendous interpretive flexibility. This flexibility
stems from the inherent and delegated power of the Court as
head of the judiciary; from the deliberately limber language and
structure of the Rules; and from the perpetual incursion of
substance into what is purported to be a purely procedural,
trans-substantive realm. The interpretive space created by
these ineluctable theoretical fault lines allows the Court to shift
seamlessly between disclaiming its interpretive power—by
casting the Rules in the role of statutes—and asserting its
power by deploying common-law interpretive techniques in a
way that resembles the not-quite-neutral managerial role of the
modern trial court. A theory of Rules interpretation must be
able to migrate across this vast interpretive space—the Great
Plains of pragmatism.
III
TOWARD A THEORY OF RULES DEFERENCE
One decade in, the Roberts Court has taken full advantage
of its interpretive muscle in cases implicating the Rules. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, it is the Roberts Court’s managerial Rules cases that have drawn scholarly focus and a good
deal of ire. The Court’s statutory Rules decisions—which tend
to interpret pure questions of law—have largely been uncontroversial, notwithstanding the risk that the Court will follow
Justice Scalia’s impulse to apply the same brittle textualism to
the Rules that it now does to statutes.263 For now, however,
the Court’s statutory cases are not making waves. Despite
occasional dissents among the Justices, and notwithstanding
low-level disputes about the deference due to the Advisory
Committee Notes,264 the Court’s statutory decisions have
served their purpose of giving clarity and predictability to
make likely success on the merits essential to class certification in securitiesfraud suits.’” (quoting Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 686 (C.A.7 2010))).
262
Burbank, supra note 247, at 715.
263
For a discussion of the Court’s statutory opinions, see supra Subpart I.A.
264
See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (rejecting reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes as authoritative
because “it is the text of the Rule that controls”).
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courts and litigants regarding the application of the Rules. In
contrast, the Court’s managerial decisions—which frequently
involve situations where the district court was required to apply a legal standard to a particular set of facts—have created
confusion rather than clarity, disruption rather than
stability.265
This Article recognizes the legitimacy, and the inevitability,
of both of the Court’s methodologies for interpreting the Rules.
As the three fault lines discussed above demonstrate, the
Court’s power over the Rules cannot be artificially confined
within narrow statutory or administrative contours.266 The
Court has both inherent and congressionally-delegated authority to set legal norms through Rules adjudication.267 In addition, neither Congress nor rulemakers have realistically
demonstrated the ability to effectively take on that role singlehandedly. Finally, there are important reasons to think of the
Rules outside of the traditional statutory interpretation box.
The Rules are imbued with a sense of flexibility and fairness: a
rigid textual approach may seem cleaner and more forthright,
but it may nevertheless foreclose consideration of the important policy considerations inherent in the Rules’ equitable
roots.268 The Court’s managerial approach to the Rules provides an important escape route from a system that might otherwise tend toward becoming hypertechnical and harsh. A
theory of Rules interpretation must be sensitive to the Rules’
unique position in the federal system; it must not suffocate
that uniqueness by forcing the Rules through a statutory
lens.269
Nevertheless, the Rules require a theoretical framework
that will provide some limits on its managerial interpretations.
265

For a discussion of the Court’s managerial opinions, see supra Subpart I.B.
See supra Part II (describing scholars’ attempts to reduce the Court’s adjudicative authority in favor of rulemaking).
267
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1190 (“[T]he Court’s role in
civil procedure is to set policy . . . through case-by-case adjudication . . . or by
promulgating generally applicable rules through a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure.”); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
268
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 531 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“For any difficult
case, there will be as many as twelve to fifteen relevant ‘valid canons’ cutting in
different directions, leaving considerable room for judicial cherry-picking.”);
Moore, supra note 5, at 1080–85 (criticizing Rehnquist Court’s textualist interpretation of the Rules as insufficiently attuned to the Rules’ purpose and intent).
269
See, e.g., supra notes 128–41 and accompanying text (describing certain
scholars’ view that liberal, flexible interpretation of the rules is better than a
constrictive, text-based interpretation).
266
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The Court’s power to pragmatically interpret the Rules is not a
free-ranging license for substantive judicial policymaking,
which at time seems to be the case under the Roberts Court.270
The common-law style of managerial interpretation is a more
dialogic, less textual method than statutory interpretation, but
it requires its own traditions of restraint, traditions that are not
currently much in evidence. In particular, the Roberts Court
has not only imitated but displaced managerial district courts
by aggressively inserting its view of the merits into its Rules
decisions. From Wal-Mart to Horne to Scott, the Roberts Court
has not simply set procedural standards through interpretation but it has used a procedural lens to adjudicate the merits
of those procedural cases.271 Such interference with lower
court discretion is not only unnecessary; it is a break from the
Rehnquist Court.272 In the vernacular of constitutional interpretation, the Roberts Court’s managerial decisions might be
described as a failure of judicial minimalism.273
Drawing from administrative law, this Article argues that
the Court’s interpretive excesses in managerial interpretation
cases should be framed as a problem of deference. The choice
of administrative law as a lens is deliberate: it purposefully
challenges the unquestioned hegemony of statutes as the
blueprint for Rules interpretation. Statutory interpretation
fails to capture essential aspects of the Rules. Moreover, in
their structure and their implementation, the Rules are more
akin to regulations than to statutes.274 In recognition of that
similarity, others have analogized the Court to an administrative agency in an effort to curtail its adjudicative power in favor
of the administrative rulemaking process.275 The analogy of
270
Take, for instance, the Court’s opinion in Pimentel. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
271
As one scholar has noted, “[t]he Supreme Court has neither a solid theory
nor a steady practice when it comes to using lower-court precedent.” AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 853
(2014).
272
Cf., e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597–98 (1993)
(overturning well-established Frye standard but remanding to lower courts for
determination of merits under new standard).
273
See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899,
1899 (2006) (describing minimalism as a “preference for narrow rulings, closely
attuned to particular facts”).
274
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
275
See generally Marcus, supra note 5 (arguing that the Court should look to
rulemakers’ intent, rather than strict textualism, in interpreting the Rules); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24 (advocating for the Court to refer certain categories of civil procedure issues to the Advisory Committee’s notice-and-comment
rulemaking process); Struve, supra note 5 (explaining that aspects of Congress’s
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the Court to an agency is apt. But the narrow scholarly focus
on the tug-of-war between rulemaking and adjudication has
obscured from view the reality that many of the Court’s excesses reside within the adjudicatory realm—they are problems
of interpretation rather than authority. The proposed deference framework would address these interpretive excesses.
This Article proposes a familiar, workable, Chevron-inspired deference regime276 that would strike a balance between
preserving the interpretive authority of the Supreme Court over
the Rules and giving lower courts—which are the true, on-theground implementers of the Rules—the breathing space to flexibly apply them.277 This framework would allow the Court to
conduct de novo review of pure questions of law—that is, questions that can be resolved using the tools of statutory interpretation. The Court’s statutory Rules decisions involve such pure
questions of law. For example, in Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Mississippi, the Court held that the text of Rule 8 does not give
courts authority to dismiss complaints that do not technically
state the legal theory supporting their claims.278 To reach this
conclusion, it was not necessary for the Court to evaluate the
particular claims at issue. Similarly, the Court’s analysis of
Rule 23(b)(2) in Wal-Mart set a clear standard limiting the use
of that provision for suits seeking monetary damages; its holding was based on the text and structure of Rule 23, not on the
substance of the underlying Title VII claims.279 The Court’s
statutory mode of interpreting the Federal Rules would remain
intact under the deference framework proposed here, with the
Court continuing to decide pure questions of Rules interpretation de novo.
The Court’s managerial mode would also be supported as
legitimate. In particular, the managerial mode of interpretation
provides a needed restraint on what otherwise might be a tendency toward rigid textualism in the Court’s statutory Rules
decisions. Yet the proposed deference framework would simuldelegation of civil procedure rulemaking power to the Court should constrain the
Court’s interpretive latitude over the Rules).
276
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984) (requiring that, unless Congressional intent is clear, courts must
defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of its enabling
statute).
277
See Manning, supra note 66, at 118 (noting that “the Chevron doctrine held
that, for purposes of judicial review of agency action, judges should read a vague
or open-ended statute as an implicit delegation of policymaking discretion to the
entity charged with implementing the statute”).
278
135 S. Ct. 346 (2014) (per curiam).
279
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
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taneously provide important restraints on the Court’s managerial Rules interpretation. Namely, as to cases in the managerial
mode—which tend to turn on the application of a Rule to particular facts—the deference framework would require the Supreme Court to defer to lower courts’ applications of the Rules
absent an abuse of discretion.280 If, upon reviewing a lower
court ruling on a procedural question, the Court clarifies or
revises the meaning of a Rule, then—rather than reaching out
to decide the merits, as for example the Court did when it held
that the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart had not proven commonality
under Rule 23(a)(2), or in finding the Twombly complaint implausible—the Court would be required to remand to allow
lower courts to assess the applicability of the new standard to
the facts in the first instance. This doctrine would preserve the
Court’s interpretive authority while simultaneously giving
lower courts breathing space to innovate in their fact-specific
applications of the trans-substantive Rules.
The blueprint for this framework comes from the so-called
“weak” form of Chevron deference in administrative law. Justice Stevens’s 1984 decision in Chevron established a two-step
process for determining when courts should defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguity.281
In the wake of the Court’s decision in Chevron, the Justices
debated whether Chevron swept broadly, or whether it was
more confined in its reach.282 On one side of the debate,
Justice Scalia championed a “strong” view of Chevron, which
gives agencies broad interpretive authority over statutes even
in situations where courts could resolve a statutory question
280
The standard under Chevron deference is reasonableness, but this proposal seeks to adapt Chevron’s framework to the specific judicial framework in Rules
cases, where abuse of discretion is more appropriate. See Effron, supra note 145,
at 725–26 (describing use of abuse of discretion standard).
281
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
282
Compare, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (Stevens,
J.) (finding, over a vociferous disagreement in a concurring opinion by Justice
Scalia that deference does not apply to pure questions of law, but rather only
applies in situations where traditional tools of statutory construction cannot answer an interpretive question), with Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009)
(Kennedy, J.) (remanding to an agency for an interpretation of a governing statute
over arguments by Justices Stevens and Breyer that the Court should have used
statutory interpretation tools to decide the question, rendering remand unnecessary). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an
Accidental Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (2014) (explaining that the Justices
who decided Chevron may not have anticipated the profound impact their decision
would have); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 302–03
(1988) (identifying and discussing “strong” and “weak” forms of the Chevron
doctrine).
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by resolution to the traditional judicial tools of statutory interpretation.283 That view ultimately won out at the Court. However, embrace of the “strong” reading of Chevron was not
universal.
Justice Stevens (the author of Chevron) and Justice Breyer
have advocated for a “weak” form of Chevron deference, which
would draw a line between “pure question[s] of statutory construction,” as to which the courts would not defer to agencies,
and questions “which can only be given concrete meaning
through a process of case-by-case adjudication,” as to which
courts must give broad deference to agency interpretations.284
This line corresponds precisely to the two interpretive paradigms in the Roberts Court’s Rules decisions.285 By analogy to
the “weak” form of Chevron, the Court properly applies de novo
review in its statutory interpretation cases—cases that involve
pure questions of law and are not dependent on the vagaries of
individualized claims. In such cases, the Court is essentially
functioning as the head of an agency interpreting a governing
statute. In its managerial interpretation cases, however, it is
the lower courts that function as the on-the-ground agency
representatives. After all, the Federal Rules are promulgated
for the district courts and courts of appeals, not for the
Supreme Court.286 The analogy to the “weak” form of Chevron
indicates that in such contexts the Court should apply a generous and meaningful form of deference to lower court findings
that involve application of the Rules to particular facts.
This deference framework confirms the legitimacy of the
Court’s use of de novo review when it uses statutory interpretation tools to interpret the Rules. Thus, the proposed deference
framework would leave the Court’s statutory paradigm for
Rules interpretation intact. It would, however, affect the
Court’s framework for analysis in managerial cases, because in
such cases the Roberts Court has tended to side-step consideration of the deference due to lower courts, imposing de novo
review even when it is reviewing decisions that involve the
lower courts’ application of a legal standard to the particular
facts of an individual case. As described above in Part II, cases
283
See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,
AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 133–34 (1987) (affording discretion to agency interpretations of ambiguous statute).
284
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446, 448.
285
See supra Part I.
286
28 U.S.C. 2072(a) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United States district
courts . . . and courts of appeals.”).
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such as Scott v. Harris, Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, and
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes are classic examples of this tendency of the Roberts Court.287 So, for example, the question of
whether a putative class sufficiently alleges common “questions of law or fact” for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) inevitably
implicates the intersection of (a)(2) with the plaintiffs’ factual
allegations and with the background substantive law. Because
of the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, a rule of deference
would mean that in Wal-Mart, once the Court clarified its understanding of commonality in Rule 23(a)(2), the Court should
have followed the suggestion in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and
remanded to the Ninth Circuit for reevaluation of the Rule
23(a)(2) question.288 Similarly, in Horne v. Flores, having
stressed the importance of Rule 60(b)(5) in the context of institutional reform litigation, the Court should have resisted the
urge to set forth a precise blueprint that essentially ordered the
lower court to apply a particular Rule 60(b)(5) analysis to the
facts—a blueprint that contravened the lower courts’ findings
on multiple factual grounds.289 Instead, the Court should have
remanded. Managerial interpretation is not micromanagerial
interpretation.
As of now, no such deference doctrine exists, and the Court
seems largely untroubled by any limits that a standard of review might impose on the scope of its interpretive power. As
discussed above,290 many of the Court’s managerial cases decide questions de novo when an abuse of discretion standard
would be more appropriate.291 Notably, the Court’s managerial
interpretation cases are rarely resolutions to pressing circuit
splits—the prototypical vehicle for Supreme Court review.292
287
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
288
As Justice Ginsburg noted, because of the Court’s other holding in WalMart eliminating certification under (b)(2), it was not necessary for the Court
to reach the Rule 23(a)(2) question to resolve the case. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2561–62 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
289
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 459–461 (2009) (remanding “for a proper
examination of . . . factual and legal changes that may warrant the granting of
relief,” but providing unambiguous and highly specific advice on research on
English Language Learning instruction, the No Child Left Behind Act, and the
Equal Education Opportunity Act, all for the obvious purpose of limiting the lower
courts’ independent review on remand).
290
See supra Part II.
291
See Effron, supra note 145, at 730 (noting that abuse of discretion is the
appropriate standard of review for legal rulings that “are heavily fact-contingent
and implicate managerial concerns”).
292
See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 241 (9th ed. 2007)
(citing Justice Ginsburg, Address, Remarks and Addresses at the 71st ALI Annual

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN103.txt

2015]

unknown

PRAGMATISM RULES

Seq: 59

28-OCT-15

12:22

181

Instead, these cases draw the Court’s attention because of
some perceived error of importance. In other words, the Court
enters managerial mode when it grants cases in order to reverse them. Given its predisposition to find error, the Court’s
lack of attention to the standard of review appears to be based
on an implicit (or, as in Pimentel, explicit293) conclusion that
once the Court perceives errors, such errors perforce rise to the
level of errors of law that are susceptible to de novo consideration.294 Yet as Wal-Mart, Iqbal, and Scott indicate, the Roberts
Court’s managerial interpretations sometimes require construction of revised factual narratives that are inseparable from
the legal analysis. The Roberts Court’s failure to give respect to
lower courts’ complex, fact-intensive decisions feeds perceptions of, and actual, overreaching in its managerial Rules
cases. A consistently-applied doctrine of Rules deference
would ameliorate both the perception and the reality of
overreach.295
Robin Effron has wisely suggested that the Rules incorporate “an ideal standard of review” into the Rules, as well as
other revisions intended to channel the reasoning of appellate
courts reviewing Rules cases.296 This suggestion seems aimed
at accomplishing the same goals as the proposed framework,
but the Court—and scholars—seem to treat the standard of
review as a mere suggestion. In addition, the standard of review, which is so deeply tied to judicial review of statutes, fails
adequately to capture the regulatory nature of the Rules. The
Chevron framework, in contrast, is well respected as an appropriate mechanism for reviewing regulations. In recognition of
the apt analogy, other scholars, specifically Mulligan and
Staszewski, have argued in favor of applying a deference framework to the Court in Rules cases. But they have sought to
apply that framework to require the Court to defer to the
rulemaking process, not to the lower courts; in other words,

Meeting 57 (1994)) (stating that about 70% of cases in which the Court grants
certiorari present circuit conflicts or conflicts between state courts of last resort).
293
See supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s dismissive treatment of the standard of review in Pimentel).
294
See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 863–64 (2008)
(describing Rule 19 inquiries as “case specific, which is consistent with a Rule
based on equitable considerations,” but declining to articulate a standard of review on the ground that the courts below made “errors of law” requiring reversal
regardless of which standard should apply).
295
Effron, supra note 145, at 730–31.
296
Id. at 730.
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they view the problem as one of judicial authority, rather than
a problem of interpretation.297
In the context of the Rules, this deference-to-rulemakers
proposal misses the mark. First, the issues that the Court
cannot answer using tools of statutory construction inevitably
confront thorny fact-specific, substance-specific problems that
would not be susceptible to resolution through rulemaking,
particularly given the lengthy, consensus-based rulemaking
process.298 Such discretionary, fact-laden questions are not
within the institutional competence of rulemakers. To the contrary, doctrinal evolution through fact-bound applications over
time is the bread and butter of the common law.299 The
rulemakers’ expertise is far more likely to be relevant in the
case of rule-like Rules than in navigating the murky standards
that bedevil the courts. In addition, it is unclear how courts
could resolve any questions involving equitable discretion
rather than statutory interpretation—questions that are endemic to Rules interpretation—under the division of labor proposed by Mulligan and Staszewski. They attempt to
circumnavigate this problem by arguing that their rulemaking
default would apply only to the Supreme Court, and not to
lower courts, thus allowing common-law percolation of Rulesrelated questions among the lower courts.300 But a doctrine of
judicial deference would accomplish the same thing, without
requiring lower courts to go without guidance until the
Supreme Court (1) grants certiorari over a case; (2) prepares for
and hears the case; (3) decides by a majority vote that it cannot
resolve the case using traditional statutory interpretation tools;
(4) refers the question to the rulemakers; and (5) the
rulemakers; take up and hopefully resolve the question.
Second, and relatedly, there are genuine logistical
problems associated with this view. If the Court adhered to
Mulligan and Staszewski’s suggested rulemaking framework,
the rulemakers would now be simultaneously contending with
unresolved questions about commonality,301 plausibility,302
297
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1221 (arguing the Court
should “refer issues that arise in civil procedure cases to the court rulemaking
process when those issues would be resolved pursuant to the second step of a
Chevron-like inquiry”).
298
See supra Section II.A.1 for a description of the rulemaking process.
299
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
300
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 24, at 1226–27.
301
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
302
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
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the impact of video evidence on the standard of review,303 and
the standard for evaluating changed circumstances that might
warrant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(5).304 Some of
these questions, such as the minimal requirements for pleading, are more trans-substantive and thus appropriate for
rulemaking than others, such as the proper Rule 60(b)(5) standard for institutional reform litigation. Complicating matters
further, it is unclear how the Court would even frame its referral to rulemakers. How could it ask them to redefine commonality with sensitivity to Title VII?305 But even assuming the
rulemakers could appropriately handle all of these questions,
resource constraints, the lengthy rulemaking process, and a
likely lack of consensus would be serious obstacles to responsive reform.
Third, these suggested forms of deference inaccurately cast
the Court as an outsider to the rulemaking process, when, as
discussed above—despite a lack of clarity over the Court’s precise role as a rulemaker—it is undisputed that Congress has
delegated rulemaking power to the Court.306 It may even be the
case that the rulemaking committees are the functional
equivalent of law clerks to the Justices—important and influential, yes, but not in charge. Recognizing the power of the
Court as a rulemaker gives theories of deference to rulemaking
a whiff of circularity, if not of self-dealing.307 For similar reasons, members of the Court have recently expressed skepticism about the Auer doctrine, according to which courts should
defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations.308 It
303

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
305
See discussion of Wal-Mart, supra Section II.C.2 (explaining interrelation of
commonality and Title VII in the majority’s opinion).
306
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure.”).
307
Struve takes the opposite stance, arguing that by confining itself to the
Advisory Committee Notes when interpreting the Rules, the Court avoids the
problem of “self-delegation,”—that is, interpreting its own laws. See Struve, supra
note 5, at 1168–69. As explained above, however, see supra Part II, the Court’s
dual power as adjudicator and rulemaker is a valid aspect of the Rules’ unique
posture.
308
See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging that [i]t may be appropriate to reconsider [Auer],” but preferring to “await a case in which the issue is properly raised
and argued”); id. at 1339, 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that “[e]nough is enough” and the Court should put an end to Auer
deference); see also Leading Cases, Clean Water Act — Auer Deference— Decker v.
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 127 HARV. L. REV. 328, 337 (2013)
(noting “the Chief Justice’s unmistakable call for litigation challenging Auer” and
concluding that its “days may be numbered”).
304
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now seems likely that Auer’s hours are numbered—and perhaps for good reason; at a minimum, therefore, Auer does not
bolster the view that the Court should defer to its own rulemaking process.309
Finally, and most basically, the focus on the tug-of-war
between the Supreme Court and the rulemaking committees
draws focus from the central relationship between the
lawmakers and those who are charged with implementing
those laws—in this case, the lower courts. In the administrative law context, Congress is the lawgiver, while the agencies
interpret and implement Congress’s will. In the analogous context of the Rules, the Court as rulemaker is the lawgiver, and it
is the lower courts that are charged at least in the first instance
with implementing the broad strokes of the law in more particularized contexts. The weak form of Chevron-style deference
proposed here captures this distinction. It also perfectly tracks
the dual nature of the Court’s interpretive practices, sanctioning both the statutory and managerial paradigms while providing a consistent and coherent limiting framework. Although
the “weak” version of Chevron deference has not prevailed as
the standard in administrative law, in the analogous structure
of the Federal Rules, the doctrine would effectively limit the
Roberts Court’s interpretive excesses while preserving its adjudicative authority to use managerial interpretation in Rules
cases.
The proposed Chevron-inspired deference framework is familiar and workable. In practice, it would affect the Court’s
decisions in two ways. First, the framework would require the
Court to be explicit regarding whether it is applying its statutory approach to a Rules question—in which case no deference
would be required—or whether it is confronting an issue that
involves judicial discretion in particular contexts, i.e., a managerial Rules question. That transparency alone would likely
mitigate some of the Court’s tendencies toward merits-intensive overreach in managerial decisions.
Second, the framework would return the Court to a tradition of narrower, more genuinely minimalist procedural decisions. As an example, compare the Roberts Court’s pleading
decisions to the Rehnquist Court’s landmark decision in
309
See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The canonical formulation of Auer deference is that [a court] will
enforce an agency’s interpretation of its own rules unless that interpretation is
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (citing Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))).
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.310 Like Twombly,
Daubert disrupted settled litigation norms: Just as the Court in
Twombly abolished the prior Conley standard for evaluating
notice pleading, the Court in Daubert overruled the well-established Frye standard for admissibility of expert testimony in
federal courts.311 Notably, however, the Court—having rejected Frye and established new governing criteria—did not
attempt to force its view of the application of that standard onto
the Ninth Circuit on remand. Even without such a step, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that
the Court had violated minimalist principles by construing FRE
702 and 703 rather than simply overruling Frye and
remanding.312
In comparison with the Roberts Court’s decisions interpreting the Federal Rules, Daubert respects lower court expertise while providing guidance on an important procedural
question. The proposed deference framework would guide the
Court toward this narrower, less merits-intrusive form of adjudication. For example, had it applied this framework, the
Court in Scott v. Harris would not have resolved the question of
whether the defendant officers were entitled to summary judgment. The Court would have noted the lower courts’ failure to
explain their consideration of the police car dashboard video,
and then remanded for further proceedings. Without this
framework, the Court could not resist imposing its own view of
the merits. Similarly, in Wal-Mart, the Court would have articulated a new commonality standard without then analyzing
the validity of the statistical evidence put forth by the plaintiffs.
It would have allowed the Ninth Circuit district court to reexamine that question. In that same vein, in Twombly the Court
would have abrogated the Conley pleading standard without
itself finding that the complaint in that case had failed to state
a claim.
CONCLUSION
Our deep, almost obsessive, focus on statutory interpretation has obscured from scholarly and judicial attention the
significance of interpretive theories for other legal texts, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules are strange
310

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id.
312
Id. at 598–601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (refusing to join the Court’s
opinion construing FRE 702 and 703 on the ground that it was unnecessary and
will raise countless questions in application by district courts).
311
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creatures: they are not statutes, yet not quite traditional
agency regulations; they are promulgated by the Court, yet in
some ways external to it; and they are universal, yet they are
always applied in particular contexts. But our interpretive theories do not fully account for the Rules’ quirky, intersectional
nature. Perhaps because we learn the Rules in the first days of
law school—before we take on the difficult project of interpretation—we do not approach the Rules with the same skepticism
that we do statutes. To lawyers, and to courts, the Rules seem
natural—a part of us. Yet the Rules are no more natural than
other legal texts. Just as is true for statutes, the Rules have no
meaning outside of an interpretive act: theory dictates practice.
Currently the Roberts Court’s theories of Rules interpretation
are fueling significant changes in the cultural norms of litigation. In order to assess and regulate those changes, we must
first have a theory for evaluating them.
This Article begins that project. It builds an interpretive
theory of the Rules by identifying the two very different—but
equally valid— methodologies that the Roberts Court applies in
its Rules cases, and then suggesting a theoretical framework
that will accommodate, and regulate, both. This framework
starts from a presumption that the Supreme Court’s interpretive role with regard to the Rules should reflect and support the
unique position of the Rules within the federal litigation system. Thus, this Article turns to administrative law, rather than
to traditional statutory interpretation, to propose a regime for
regulating the Court’s Rules interpretation. It argues that a
Chevron-inspired deference regime will provide a workable, familiar mechanism for regulating, without suffocating, the
Court’s interpretive freedom. As this Article shows, a coherent
theory of Rules interpretation is valuable for the Rules themselves; it also sheds light on the extent to which our zeal for
statutory interpretation may inadvertently impoverish our understanding of vital, but nonstatutory, legal texts.

